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Camier: Controlling the Wrath of Self-Representation: The ICTY's Crucial

CONTROLLING THE WRATH OF SELFREPRESENTATION: THE ICTY’S CRUCIAL
TRIAL OF RADOVAN KARADŽIĆ
I. INTRODUCTION
The brutalities of the Bosnian War are best narrated by someone who
witnessed the worst of the atrocities.1 Various concentration camps,
such as Omarska, populated the Bosnian landscape, and “the screams of
those being ‘interrogated’ by Serb camp guards determining who took
part in the ‘Muslim rebellion’” echoed throughout the land.2 Fear filled
the air when “[t]he guards would call out their victim’s name, drag him
out of the room and then beat him: with wooden batons, metal rods,
rifle butts, knives, hammers, pipes filled with lead, and long lengths of
thick industrial cable with metal affixed on both ends.”3 One particular
Muslim prisoner, Hamdo, spent a portion of his life “[p]acked in a filthy,
lice-infested room in a two-story white garage with about 150 men.”4
These prisoners begged for food, and when their once-a-day meal did
arrive, the “jeering guards made Hamdo and the others run a gauntlet to
the canteen to get it, pouring water on the tiles to make them slippery.
Whoever fell got beaten or, sometimes, shot.”5 The prison guards
allowed the deplorable conditions to continually worsen with “feces
foul[ing] the room.”6 Guards “forced the prisoners to crawl on their
knees, like animals, to pick up food while the guards peppered the
ground with bullets.”7
Unfortunately, female victims did not escape the horrors of the
concentration camps either, and some “spent their days crammed in the
mining complex’s glass-walled restaurant” where guards would rape
them.8 In addition, the guards “forc[ed] the women to clean the blood
from the walls” and “[i]f they didn’t cooperate, they’d join the corpses
they saw on a daily basis being thrown over the hedges or stacked like
cordwood on the grass.”9
See ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN
BOSNIA AND RWANDA (2006). Neuffer is a journalist who interviewed victims, perpetrators,
judges, and war criminals and shares their experiences and what she witnessed in this
novel. Id. at back cover. Neuffer follows her characters from the battlefield to the
courtroom as they search for justice, catharsis, and reconciliation. Id.
2
Id. at 40.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 41.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
1
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Victims of the Bosnian War, such as Hamdo, have had a hard route
to justice. The United Nations Security Council created the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) to attempt to
establish accountability.10 However, some defendants found ways to
avoid or delay being held responsible by acting as their own counsel and
adopting a defense strategy that involved disrupting the trial
proceedings.11 These disruptions caused embarrassment for the tribunal
and delayed exposing those responsible for the crimes committed.
The ICTY must adjust its current framework for balancing its own
interest of conducting an efficient trial against the defendant’s right to
self-representation.12 A change is needed to ensure that the courtroom
cannot be used for a defendant’s own personal gain.13 Moreover, the
ICTY can accomplish a balance without impinging on the defendants’
right of self-representation.14
This Note reveals the deficiency of a proper mechanism at the ICTY
for controlling self-represented, defiant defendants in addition to
offering a solution that addresses concerns of opposing sides. Part II of
this Note focuses on Yugoslavia’s history of conflicts, the creation of the
ICTY, and its treatment of the right of self-representation that led to
Radovan Karadžić (“Karadžić”) manipulating this right.15 Part III of this
Note analyzes the reasons why ICTY defendants choose selfrepresentation and why the ICTY needs to control these defendants.16
Further, Part III analyzes strengths and weaknesses of its control
mechanisms and treatment of self-representation, in addition to
analyzing the implications if a mechanism is not developed in the
Karadžić trial.17 Part IV of this Note proposes a balancing method that
elaborates on a three-strikes approach, which will serve as a clear guide

See generally infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the need for the creation of the ICTY).
See generally infra Parts II.C–E (discussing the origin of self-representation).
12
See generally infra Part III.D (discussing the control mechanisms used by the ICTY to
control self-represented defendants).
13
See generally infra Parts III.A–B (discussing why defendants decide to use selfrepresentation and why it is crucial for the ICTY to control the self-represented
defendants).
14
See generally infra Part IV (discussing the solution to maintaining order in the
courtroom while respecting the defendant’s right to self-representation).
15
See infra Part II (setting up the background and history of the ICTY with a specific
focus on its recent trials involving self-represented defendants).
16
See infra Part III (looking at both the defendant’s and ICTY’s point of view with
respect to self-representation).
17
See infra Part III (analyzing control mechanisms’ strengths and weaknesses, and
implications on tribunals).
10
11
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for future regional criminal tribunals and other courts faced with the
same dilemma.18
II. BACKGROUND
The right of self-representation applies to defiant defendants of the
ICTY, but it also serves as a reflection of the world’s ideals of fairness,
justice, and fundamental rights.19 Part II.A.1 provides background of the
former Yugoslavia leading up to the Bosnia-Herzegovina War of the
early 1990s and provides a summary of the cultural and ethnic
relationships that led to its descent into violence.20 Part II.A.2 discusses
the creation of the ICTY and its various departments.21 Part II.B
summarizes the ICTY’s major trial of Slobodan Milošević and how he
redefined self-representation by incorporating delays and stall tactics.22
Part II.C explains the right of self-representation and how other
defendants emulated Milošević’s strategy to frustrate the ICTY.23 Part
II.D discusses the various control mechanisms the ICTY used to control
self-represented, defiant defendants.24
Finally, Part II.E discusses
Radovan Karadžić’s arrest, upcoming trial, and threat to exercise his
right of self-representation to embarrass the ICTY through delays and
stall tactics.25
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The ICTY developed from a gruesome war filled with outrageous
crimes.26 However, exploring the history leading up to the Bosnian
conflict provides deeper insight into the specific purpose of the ICTY and

See infra Part IV (attempting to resolve the conflict between respecting the defendant’s
right to self-representation and the court’s right to an efficient trial).
19
See infra notes 73–75 (discussing the origin and treatment of the fundamental right of
self-representation).
20
See infra Part II.A.1 (setting out the background leading up to the Bosnian Conflict of
the 1990s and the creation of the ICTY).
21
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the various departments and its functions in the ICTY).
22
See infra Part II.B (discussing how Slobodan Milošević developed a new defense
strategy with his use of self-representation).
23
See infra Part II.C (discussing the origin and evolution of self-representation).
24
See infra Part II.D (discussing the various control mechanisms implemented by the
ICTY to control defiant, self-represented defendants).
25
See infra Part II.E (discussing the arrest of Radovan Karadžić, his upcoming trial, and
his threat of the use of self-representation).
26
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the events that led up to the establishment of the
ICTY).
18
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the reasons that the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution
creating the tribunal.27
1.

Brief History of the Events Leading up to the Creation of the ICTY

The United Nations Security Council created the ICTY after the
Yugoslavia conflict of the 1990s, in order to establish accountability for
crimes and punish perpetrators.28 The Bosnian War of the 1990s
developed from a long history of turmoil, ethnic strife, and conflict.29
Various powers controlled Yugoslavia for many years and infused
hatred into the culture.30 Battles for control signaled Yugoslavia’s role in
World War I as Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina despite Russia’s
and Serbia’s protests, leading to the 1914 assassination of Archduke
Ferdinand and the start of World War I.31 World War II also disrupted
See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the significant history necessary to explain the need for
the ICTY).
28
See United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Establishment, http://www.icty.org/sid/319 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). The ICTY website
explains that the United Nations created the tribunal in order to end impunity for war
crimes committed throughout the Bosnian war. Id. In late 1992, the UN assigned experts to
examine the situation in Yugoslavia. Id. The Commission of Experts reported serious
violations of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law. Id. That report
led to the Security Council’s decision to establish the tribunal. Id.
29
See James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in Internal Conflicts, in ENFORCING
RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 27, 30 (Lori Fisler
Damrosch, ed., 1993). Steinberg explains that:
Modern Yugoslavia arose after World War I from the ashes of
millennia of conflict and two great empires: the Austro-Hungarian
empire (which at its height embraced all of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia,
and Vojvodina) and the Ottoman empire (which conquered Kosovo in
1389 and at one time controlled virtually all of the region, but whose
influence diminished until the empire was finally expelled during the
First Balkan War in 1912).
Id.
30
See Scott Grosscup, The Trial of Slobodan Milošević: The Demise of Head of State Immunity
and the Specter of Victor’s Justice, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 355, 381 (2004) (discussing that
in 1389, the Turks defeated the Serbs in the Battle of Kosovo Polje, which resulted in
turmoil that lasted nearly 700 years); see also Michael P. Roch, Military Intervention in BosniaHercegovina: Will World Politics Prevail Over the Rule of International Law?, 24 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 461, 463 (1996) (asserting that the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Ottoman
Empire each wanted their newly acquired region to live by their values, that the people of
the region became resentful, leading to restlessness and ethnic clashes, causing upheavals,
migration, and the need for independence). See generally Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional
Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia’s and Croatia’s
Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L REV 213, 234 (1992) (discussing that the Hungarian
throne ruled Croatia for over 800 years).
31
John Laughland discusses how:
There seemed to be no immediate consequences when, in 1908, Austria
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Vienna was in clear violation of the
27
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Yugoslavia, as various European powers divided and ruled Yugoslavia,
prompting violence throughout the territory.32
After World War II, two competing political views enveloped
Yugoslavia, leading to internal conflicts between the Greater Serbian
nation (“Chetniks”) and the Communist Party (“Partisans”).33
Eventually the Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito (“Tito”), prevailed, and
the country enjoyed peace and prosperity from 1945 until Tito’s death in
1980.34 Those ethnic groups, which once fiercely fought against each
1878 Treaty of Berlin, which it had signed and kept Bosnia in Turkey,
yet the protests of Russia and Serbia were in vain. Six years later, a
Russian-backed Serbian gunman exacted revenge by assassinating the
heir to the Austrian throne in Sarajevo in June 1914. The rest is history.
A Post-Modern Declaration, HINDU 11, Feb. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 3330345.
32
See YUGOSLAVIA, A COUNTRY STUDY 37 (Glenn E. Curtis 3d ed. 1992). Yugoslavia was
divided as follows: Germany had Serbia, parts of Vojvodina, Croatia, and most of Bosnia
and Hercegovina. Id. Italy took southern Slovenia and most of Dalmatia, Kosovo, and
Montenegro. Id. Hungary occupied a part of Vojvodina and Slovenian and Croatians
borders. Id. Bulgaria had Macedonia and a part of southern Serbia. Id. See also NOEL
MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 175–76 (1994) (explaining that the Independent State
of Croatia’s internment of Jews began in June of 1941 and that in August, 1941, Serbia
began the process of capturing Jews and by the end of 1941 Serbia placed a majority of the
Jews in concentration camps); Roch, supra note 30, at 465–66 (explaining that it is estimated
that nearly two million Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies were destroyed through such tactics as
religious conversion, deportation, and violence).
33
See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case. No. IT-95-14, Transcript (Sept. 8, 1998). The
communist party gathered troops to wage liberation against the occupiers. Id. Followers of
the Greater Serbia vision sought to redefine their borders and focused on creating a
‘Greater’ nation. Id. This meant that it needed to eliminate Croatia and acquire Vojvodina,
Montenegro, Macdonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. Id. Also, Serbia depended on
obtaining Bajo, Pec, a part of Bulgaria, and a portion of Romania because it was an allied
country. Id. The Chetniks envisioned the Great Serbian nation and their leader was
Mihajlović; Josip Broz Tito led the Communist Party, which included the Partisians. Id.
There was a myth about Mihajlović campaigning against fascism and he was deemed a
hero. Id. Furthermore, tensions arose between Tito and Mihajlović and their respective
armies. Id. The communist party believed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia needed to be
divided and tried to advance this idea by forming federal, military, and political structures
to wage war against Mihajlović and his troops. Id. The communist party sought to have
each population acquire its own independent nation, with Serbia restricted to its original
boundaries. Id. See also ROBERT J. DONIA & JOHN V.A. FINE, JR., BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA:
A TRADITION BETRAYED 146–47 (1994) (explaining that the Partisans preached that there
should be no hatred among the various groups and that they should unite; the Communist
party thought of all ethnic groups as distinct yet equal and that they should unite to fend
off the occupying powers; and the Chetniks and Mihajlović strongly opposed this idea and
maintained a Serbia-centric mindset).
34
See NEUFFER, supra note 1, at 18. Neuffer explains that:
Tito represented Yugoslavia’s potential for diversity. He decided the
best way to preserve that diversity was to do away with ethnic identity
in favor of a nationalist one. Declaring a policy Bratstvo i Jedinstvo, or
“Brotherhood and Unity,” Tito mandated that all Croats, Serbs,
Macedonians, and all the rest no longer existed: All were Yugoslavs.
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other, began socializing with one another.35 However, when Tito died,
the feeling of distrust and hatred reemerged, and the Bosnian War
erupted.36
Throughout the Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s, political leaders
and corrupt military officers committed atrocious crimes.37 These
Id.
See also YUGOSLAVIA, A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 32, at 50 (noting that after passage
of the amendments to the Constitution, living conditions and the economy improved. For
example, between 1957 and 1960, Yugoslavia had the second highest economic growth rate.
Furthermore, the government re-invested in production of consumer goods and allowed
foreign products to enter the region. Religious restrictions loosened, and artists were free
to express their views, including the Nobel Prize-Winner Ivo Andrić. Moreover,
throughout the reforms in the 1960s Yugoslavia extended its self-management theory to the
social realm, and created local councils for the areas of education, religion, health, and
politics); Grosscup, supra note 30, at 357 (explaining that peace was the norm in Yugoslavia
because “[f]rom 1945 until Tito’s death in 1980, ethnic tensions and nationalistic
movements were suppressed by the state through relocating Serb minorities in the various
republics outside of Serbia”); Sergio Baches Opi & Ryan Floyd, A Shaky Pillar of Global
Stability: The Evolution of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 9 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 299, 305 (2003) (discussing how Tito was able to maintain his multinational state
and actually have moderate economic growth); Peter J. Cannon, The Third Balkan War and
Political Disunity: Creating a Confederated Cantonal Constitutional System, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L.
& POL’Y 373, 386 (1996) (explaining that the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia contained ideological ideas and extended responsibilities to the Yugoslavia
population).
35
See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 48 (July 31, 2003).
Ethnically diverse marriages and personal friendships displayed this idea of tolerance. Id.
Various people created relationships despite ethnic divides. Id. This positive attitude
towards each other maintained peace in the area for almost fifty years. Id. See also
Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-08-91-PT, Supplemental Pre-Trial Brief of the Defence of
Mićo Stanišić ¶ 5.m (July 31, 2009) (indicating that many people of the region spoke “of
good inter-communal relations, of friendships across ethnic and coincident religious
divides, of intermarriages and of generally harmonious relations”); LAURA SILBER & ALLAN
LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION 28–29 (1997) (stating that Josip Broz Tito unified
Yugoslavia by “work[ing] to prevent his state from suffering the same fate as its
predecessor” and “keep[ing] the nations on an equal footing . . . [by] ruthlessly
suppress[ing] any expression of resurgent nationalism”); Jetish Jashari, U.N. Field Missions
in the Context of Legal and Judicial Reform: The Kosovo Case, 1 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 76, 87
(2007) (explaining that at the ceremony for the creation of the Federal Yugoslavia, at Jajce in
1943, Tito reiterated his message that Yugoslavia was “founded on a democratic and
federative principle and champion[ed] equal rights for all peoples”).
36
See Lindsay Peterson, Shared Dilemmas: Justice for Rape Victims Under International Law
and Protection for Rape Victims Seeking Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 509, 512
(2008). After Tito unified the countries into Yugoslavia, the ethnic tensions rekindled and
exploded when Tito died in 1980. Id. This led to dramatic events during the 1980s and
1990s such as Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia declaring independence and the Bosnia-Serbs
initiating an ethnic-cleansing plan. Id.
37
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Initial Indictment (Nov. 22, 2001).
The ICTY indicted, former head of state, Slobodan Milošević, and charged him with
genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, and
violations of the law or customs of war. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No.IT-03-67-I,
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violations spanned across all involved parties, not just one side.38 To
seek justice for these acts, the United Nations Security Council created
the ICTY.39
2.

Creation of ICTY

The crimes committed throughout Yugoslavia’s conflict outraged the
public and demanded a response in the form of a tribunal.40 The
Security Council of the United Nations passed Resolution 827 in order to
establish the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons

Initial Indictment (Feb. 15, 2003) (explaining that the ICTY indicted Vojislav Šešelj, leader of
the Serbian Freedom Movement, and charged him with crimes against humanity and
violations of the laws or customs of war); Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-I,
Initial Indictment (Mar. 21, 2000) (explaining that the ICTY indicted Momčilo Krajišnik,
leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, and charged him with genocide, crimes against
humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions); Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Initial Indictment
(July 24, 1995) (explaining that the ICTY indicted Radovan Karadžić, president of the
Serbian Democratic Party, and Ratko Mladić, Commander of the Yugoslav People’s Army,
and charged them with genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes that were perpetrated
against the civilian population and against places of worship throughout Bosnia, sniping
against civilians, and taking United Nations peacekeepers as hostages).
38
See Ivana Nizich, Violations of the Rules of War by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 30–36 (1994). Bosnian Croat troops were
responsible for the massacres of Muslim civilians in the villages of Ahmići and Stupni, the
detention of thousands of Muslim men, women, and children, and the expulsion of families
from their homes. Id. The Bosnian Government and Muslim Troops executed civilians and
displaced Croat families from Central Bosnia. Id.
39
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the creation of the ICTY).
40
In the Resolution’s preamble the Security Council stated that it was:
Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law
occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and especially
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass
killings, massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of
women, and the continuance of the practice of “ethnic cleansing”,
including for the acquisition and the holding of territory, . . .
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them
....
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter Resolution], at 1. See
United Nations: Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law [sic]
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1203, 1204. See also Justice, Accountability, and Social Reconstruction: An Interview
Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 102, 144 (2000) (asserting
that the establishment of tribunal for the crimes committed in Yugoslavia was the first war
crimes tribunal since Tokyo).
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Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia.41
The Security Council formed the ICTY with the hope of revealing the
truth, creating a historical record, deterring denials, ceasing violence,
and identifying responsible individuals.42 To accomplish these goals, the
ICTY used the Nuremberg Tribunal as a model, specifically with regard
to jurisdiction.43 Article 3 of the ICTY statute gave the tribunal
41
Resolution, supra note 40, at 2. One of the main reasons behind the establishment of
the ICTY was that the Security Council considered the situation in Yugoslavia to be a
“threat to international peace and security.” Id. at 1. See also Rebecca L. Haffajee,
Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: The Application of Joint Criminal
Enterprise Theory, 29 HARV. J. L. & GEN. 201, 201 (2006) (explaining that around the same
time as the Yugoslavia Conflict, a similar atrocity was occurring in Rwanda; in the Rwanda
conflict in 1994, perpetrators used rape and sexual violence as a tool for genocide, targeting
the Tutsi women civilians); Bethany Conner, “You Made a Mistake—You Selected a Woman!”:
The Implementation of Political Gender Quotas in Post Conflict African Nations, 17 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L 203, 222 (2008) (stating that throughout the Rwandan genocide, over 800,000
people were killed); Katharine Orlovsky, International Criminal Law: Towards New Solutions
in the Fight Against Illegal Arms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV 343, 355 (2006)
(asserting that as for the ICTY and its statute, the United Nations Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as a response to the crimes that
took place throughout its conflict); Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
687, 695 (2006) (indicating that the Security Council vote was not unanimous to uphold the
resolution to create the ICTR, unlike the ICTY).
42
See Anna Petrig, Negotiated Justice and the Goals of International Criminal Tribunals, 8
CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 11–12 (2008). Petrig asserts that another reason for the
establishment of the ICTY was to allow victims to be heard, to have their suffering
acknowledged, and to possibly award them retribution. Id. See also United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Achievements,
http://www.icty.org/sid/324 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). The tribunal listed additional
goals of developing international law and strengthening the rule of law. Id. The ICTY is
credited as a precedent for establishing other international courts, including the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the
International Criminal Court. Id. The ICTY has developed the law concerning torture,
legal treatment and punishment of sexual violence in wartime, genocide, enslavement and
persecution, and command responsibility. Id. The ICTY also developed procedural
measures for protecting witnesses, confidentiality and disclosure of information relevant
for the national security of states, guilty pleas of accused, and duress as a defense. Id. To
strengthen the rule of law, the ICTY worked with domestic courts throughout Yugoslavia
in order to transfer evidence, knowledge, and jurisprudence to the region to help continue
to bring justice to the victims. Id.
43
Courts like the ICTY and ICTR are unique and temporary courts that certain
advocates suggest be used to solve international problems. Allison Marston Danner, When
Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 60 (2006). However, most of the international ad-hoc courts are established after
a catastrophic event, and activists need to have a template ready in case a situation arises
where a court is necessary. Id. In order to proceed to seek justice from the conflict in
Yugoslavia, the ICTY needed to narrow its scope and decide which topic areas it would
prosecute. Statute of the International Tribunal arts. 2–5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192
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jurisdiction over war crimes, defined as acts that violate the law of war.44
Article 5 of the statute gave the ICTY jurisdiction over crimes against
[hereinafter International Tribunal Statute]. Furthermore, the ICTY is restricted to trying
only incidents that occurred in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Id. art. 8.
It has also announced that its jurisdiction is only over individual persons, and is not
allowed to prosecute “organisations, political parties, administrative entities, or other legal
subject.”
43
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, About the
ICTY—Mandate and Jurisdiction, http://www.icty.org/sid/320 (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
Lastly, the ICTY proclaimed that it would have concurrent jurisdiction but it can claim
primacy and take over national proceedings “if this proves to be in the interest of
international justice.” International Tribunal Statute art. 9; Andrew Dubinsky, An
Examination of International Sentencing Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to the
International Criminal Court’s Sentencing Structure, 33 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 609, 612 (2007) (explaining that the ICTY looked to the Nuremberg trial for
guidance with establishing which crimes to charge). The International Criminal Court has
different jurisdiction than the ICTY and has jurisdiction only if:
[t]he accused is a national of a State Party or a State otherwise
accepting jurisdiction of the Court; [t]he crime took place on the
territory of a State Party or a State otherwise accepting the jurisdiction
of the Court; or [t]he United Nations Security Council has referred the
situation to the Prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the
accused or the location of the crime.
International Criminal Court, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, http://www.icccpi.int/about/ataglance /jurisdiction_admissibility.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
44
International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, art. 3. The ICTY explicitly can charge
war crimes. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Oct. 2, 1995). During the Tadić trial,
the ICTY established a more in-depth definition of war crimes. Id. The ICTY held that war
crimes consist of:
(i) an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the
rule must be customary in nature or [be a part of an applicable treaty];
(iii) the violation must be “serious”, [which means the broken rule
must] protect[] important [human] values and must involve grave
consequences for the victim . . . ; (iv) the violation of the rule must
entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal
responsibility of the person breaching the rule.
Id. Each war crime must take place during an international armed conflict and the
perpetrator must be aware of the facts that caused the armed conflict. ASSEMBLY OF STATES
PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, New York, U.S.,
Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records, pt. II(B), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf. Id. Therefore with
respect to these two elements:
There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to
the existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or
non-international; In that context there is no requirement for
awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character
of the conflict as international or non-international; There is only a
requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the
terms “took place in the context of and was associated with.”
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humanity, or more commonly known as crimes of mass atrocity.45
Article 2 of the ICTY statute also permitted the tribunal to hear claims of

Id.
The indictment of Šešelj gives examples of Šešelj’s war crimes. Prosecutor v. Šešelj,
Case No. IT-03-67-I, Initial Indictment, ¶¶ 22, 25–26 (Jan. 15, 2003). For example, in April
1992, Serb forces under his control attacked and seized the town of Zvornik, killing nonSerb civilians. Id. Additionally, Šešelj’s troops executed twenty non-Serb men and boys in
Zvornik. Id. During this attack, Šešelj’s forces detained, beat, and tortured non-Serbs. Id.
Šešelj’s followers detained and killed many non-Serbs at the shoe factory, a technical
school, and slaughter-house. Id. On another occasion Šešelj’s troops captured and
detained hundreds of Croat, Muslim, and non-Serb civilians at a warehouse, farm, and
police headquarters. Id. The conditions of these facilities were deplorable and included
“inhumane treatment, overcrowding, starvation, forced labour, inadequate medical care
and systematic physical and psychological assault, including torture, beatings and sexual
assault.” Id. Milošević’s war crimes included destroying homes of Bosnian Muslim,
Bosnian Croat, and other non-Serb civilians in order to force them from their legal
domiciles and prevent their return. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Initial
Indictment, ¶ 42–43 (Nov. 22, 2001). Additionally, Milošević destroyed mosques,
churches, libraries, educational building, and cultural centers. Id. Over a three-year span
from 1992 to 1995, Milošević shelled and sniped civilian areas of Sarajevo, killing and
injuring thousands of all ages and of both sexes. Id. Krajišnik attempted to control parts of
Bosnia by creating impossible living condition, involving persecution and terror tactics,
deporting citizens who were reluctant to leave, and liquidating others. Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-I, Initial Indictment, ¶ 5–6 (Mar. 21, 2000).
45
International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, at art. 5. The ICTY can charge crimes
against humanity. Id. See also Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. The Nuremburg
Tribunal originally defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime . . . whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides the broadest definition
of crimes against humanity, including:
[T]he following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c)
enslavement; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e)
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) torture; (g) rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity; (h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection
with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) enforced disappearance of persons; (j) the
crime of apartheid; (k) other inhumane acts of a similar character
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grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, which consisted of violations
against the protected people included in the Geneva Conventions.46
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 art 7.
Karadžić, Mladić, the Bosnian Serb military, and the Bosnian Serb police specifically
persecuted civilian political leaders, members of the Bosnian Muslim political party,
members of the Party for Democratic Action, and members of the Croatian Democratic
Union. Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Initial Indictment, ¶ 23–25
(July 24, 1995). Under the direction of Karadžić and Mladić, the Bosnian Serb military
forced thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats out of their homes, detained
them, and deported or transferred them outside the boundaries of Bosnia. Id. In May 1992,
Šešelj gave a speech mandating the expulsion of Croats from the area and listed individual
Croats who should leave. Šešelj, IT-03-67-I, Initial Indictment at ¶ 29. After his speech,
Šešelj campaigned for ethnic-cleansing directed at Croats and began to harass, threaten,
intimidate, and force them to leave the area. Id. Serbs looted the homes of Croats. Id.
46
International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, art. 2. The ICTY has the power to charge
grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions. Id. See also Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (providing that fixed or mobile medical units may not
be attacked, medical personnel performing medical treatment are protected, and buildings
and material of medical establishments cannot be intentionally destroyed); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (providing
that armed forces or persons at sea who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked are protected,
parties performing burials at sea must confirm death, establish an identity, and make a
report, and military hospital ships may not be attacked); Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (providing
that prisoners of war must be humanely treated, questioning of prisoners must be in a
language they understand, personal effects, including identification documents shall
remain in the possession of prisoners of war, and prisoners of war must be afforded daily
food rations, sufficient drinking water, and adequate clothing, underwear, and footwear);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (providing that populations of countries, without distinction
between race, nationality, religion, or political opinion, are intended to be protected from
the suffering of war, civilian hospitals may not be attacked, women cannot be raped or
forced into prostitution, collective punishments, terrorism and pillage are prohibited,
private property is protected, the taking of hostages is not allowed); Richard John Galvin,
The ICC Prosecutor, Collateral Damages, and NGOS: Evaluating the Risk of a Politicized
Prosecution, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005) (explaining that the difference a
grave breach and a non-grave breach of the Geneva Conventions; the difference is that “a
grave breach is considered an offense of universal jurisdiction that imposes a duty for a
state to prosecute or extradite an offender,” whereas a non-grave breach “leaves the
method for preventing such breaches to the discretion of the parties who may use
administrative or disciplinary sanctions as well as penal sanctions”); Krajišnik, IT-00-39-I,
Amended Indictment at ¶ 11 (explaining that under the control of Krajišnik, his forces in
June 1992 executed hundred of Bosnian Muslim men, women, and children of Viegrad at
various bridges over the Drina; in November of 1992, Krajišnik’s troops killed
approximately 190 Bosnian Muslim males in the village of Dabovci; on or about May 25,
1992, Krajišnik’s forces killed more than thirty Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat women
and children in the village of Hrustovo). Milošević and his troops coerced Bosnian citizens
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Last, Article 4 allowed the ICTY to prosecute genocide, which included
the attempt to extinguish an entire group of people based on a
characteristic, such as religion or race.47 However, the ICTY needed
specialized groups, such as office of the prosecution and office of the
registry, to carry out its mission.48

to sign documents relinquishing their property rights. Milosevic, IT-01-51-I at ¶ 42,
Schedule c, D. Milošević allowed for the establishment of detention centers to unlawfully
detain citizens at the Petar Kočić Elementary School, the Mlakve Football Stadium, the
Mostina Hunting Lodge, and at the Kotor Varos Sawmill among many others. Id.
Milošević and his followers forcibly and unlawfully transferred or expelled 268,050 people
from Bosnia. Id.
47
International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, art. 4. For proof of genocide one needs to
prove one or more underlying crime or act such as:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. Furthermore, any of the following acts are punishable:
(f) genocide;
(g) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(h) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(i) attempt to commit genocide;
(j) complicity in genocide.
Id.
Milošević detained thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats “under
conditions of life calculated to bring about the partial physical destruction of those groups,
namely through starvation, contaminated water, forced labour, inadequate medical care
and constant physical and psychological assault.” Milošević, IT-01-51-I, Indictment at ¶ 32.
The definition of genocide does not include the attempt to annihilate cultural or
sociological characteristics that give a group its identity. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 25 (Apr. 19,
2004).
However, because physical or biological destruction of a group is often
accompanied with destruction of culture or religion, these instances can be used as
evidence to prove intent to demolish a particular group. Id. For example, in the Krstić
Case, the Trial Chamber considered the destruction of mosques and houses belonging to
Muslims as evidence of intent to destroy the group. Krajišnik advocated for a new Serbian
state that contained nearly no Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat. Krajišnik, IT-00-39-I,
Amended Indictment at ¶ 46. In order to accomplish this goal, the Serbian Democratic
Party implemented a plan to permanently remove or ethnically cleanse the territory of
most Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and non-Serb population, allowing only a small
percentage to remain if they agreed to living in a Serb-controlled state. Id. Under the reign
of Karadžić and Mladić, thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians were
persecuted. Karadžić and Mladić, IT-95-5-I, Indictment at ¶ 18, 22. Serbian guards under
the command of Karadžić and Mladić raped women and girl detainees, starved the
detainees, and failed to provide adequate medical care. Id.
48
See infra notes 49–51, 53–55 (discussing the various departments of the ICTY and their
duties).
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With the tribunal and its jurisdiction and goals approved, the ICTY
also needed to establish its organizational facets such as the Chambers,
the Registry, and the Office of the Prosecutor to carry out the duties of
the tribunal.49 The Chambers of the ICTY created sixteen permanent
judges and at most twelve ad litem judges.50 The maximum sentence the
ICTY allowed was life imprisonment.51 The Offices of the Registry and
the Prosecutor also served an extremely important role in the ICTY.52
49
See Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
82, 89 (2005) (explaining that recent procedural reforms to the Appeals Chambers enabled
the three organs to operate more effectively). See also Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an
International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 652 (2007) (describing how the Chambers performs the adjudicative
function, the Prosecutor performs the prosecutorial function, and the Registry performs the
administrative function).
50
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Chambers,
http://www.icty.org /sections/AbouttheICTY/Chambers (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). The
United Nations General Assembly chose the judges. Id. The judges serve for four years.
Id. The United Nations General Assembly also chose ad litem judges who also serve for
four years. Id. With approval, ad litem judges may sit on a specific trial for up to three
years of the judge’s term. Id. Furthermore, ad litem judges may serve as reserve judges and
replace a judge who is no longer able to serve his/her duty. Id. The ICTY assigned the
judges for placement in the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber, with each trial
chamber consisting of three permanent judges and the appeals chambers having either one
permanent judge and two ad litem judges or two permanent judges and one ad litem judge.
Id. The Appeals Chamber consists of seven permanent judges: five from the permanent
judges of the ICTY, and two from the 11 permanent judges of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Id. These seven judges also constitute the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTR. Id. Each appeal is heard and decided by five judges. Id. As of Feb. 26, 2009,
the current judges are President Faustro Pocar of Italy, Vice-President Kevin Parker of
Australia, Presiding Judge Patrick Lipton Robinson of Jamaica, Presiding Judge Carmel A.
Agius of Malta, Presiding Judge Alphonsus Martinus Maria Orie of the Netherlands, Judge
Mohamed Shahabuddeen of Guyana, Judge Mehmet Guney of Turkey, Judge Lui Daqun of
China, Judge Andresia Vaz of Senegal, Judge Theodor Meron of the United States of
America, Judge Wolfgang Schomburg of Germany, Judge O-Gon Kwon of South Korea,
Judge Jean-Clude Antonetti of France, Judge Iain Bonomy of the United Kingdom, Judge
Christine Van Den Wyngaert of Belgium, Judge Bakone Justice Moloto of South Africa, Ad
Litem Judge Janet M. Nosworthy of Jamaica, Ad Litem Judge Arpad Prandler of Hungary,
Ad Litem Judge Stegan Trechsel of Switzerland, Ad Litem Judge Antonie Kesia-Mbe
Mindua of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ad Litem Judge Ali Nawz Chowhan of
Pakistan, Ad Litem Judge Tsvetana Kamenova of Bulgaria, Ad Litem Judge Kimberly Prost
of Canada, Ad Litem Judge Ole Bjorn Stole of Norway, Ad Litem Judge Frederik Harhoff of
Denmark, Ad Litem Judge Flavia Lattanzi of Italy, Ad Litem Judge Pedro R. David of
Argentina, Ad Litem Judge Elizabeth Gwaunza of Zimbabwe, Ad Litem Judge Michele
Picard of France, and Ad Litem Judge Uldis Kinis of Latvia. Id.
51
See United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Judgements and Sentences, http://www.icty.org/sid/147 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009)
(explaining that the Trial Chamber must take into consideration a penalty that a national
court has already imposed on the accused for the same act).
52
See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text (discussing the powers and duties of the
Registry and prosecutor and how they impact the ICTY).
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The ICTY directed that the Registry control the administrative and
judicial services that enable the court to operate efficiently along with
handling diplomatic functions.53 The tribunal allowed the Office of
Prosecutor to include police officers, crime experts, analysts, lawyers,
and trial attorneys who conduct their investigations independent of the
Security Council or any other international organization.54 The Office of
the Prosecutor indicted 161 criminals, arrested 38 accused persons,
provisionally released 3 accused persons until further notice, and
concluded 116 proceedings as of February 26, 2009.55
In order for the ICTY to be effective, the United Nations Security
Council established various aspects, such as jurisdiction, organs of the
ICTY, and goals.56 The Bosnian War represented the first conflict
involving genocide in Europe since World War II, and the Security
Council wanted to deter atrocities.57 To accomplish that goal, the ICTY
53
See United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Registry, http://www.icty.org /sections/AbouttheICTY/Registry (last visited Feb. 26,
2009). The registry provides an abundance of administrative and judicial support. Id. This
includes translating documents and court proceedings. Id. In addition the registry
organizes the hearings, filings and archive, legal aid program for those who cannot afford
counsel, protection of witness, and management of the Detention unit. Id. Moreover, the
registry is in charge of all communications. Id. As of the writing of this Note, the current
Registrar was Hans Holthuis of Australia who has held this position since January 1, 2001
and the Deputy Registrar is John Hocking of the Netherlands who has held that position
since December 1, 2004. Id.
54
See Dermot Groome, Adjudicating Genocide: Is the International Court of Justice Capable of
Judging State Criminal Responsibility?, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 911, 958–59 (2008). Groome
asserts that Article 16 of the ICTY statute gave the Office of the Prosecutor broad
discretionary power when deciding whom to charge and what to charge. Id. Furthermore,
“[u]nlike many continental systems the prosecutor is not required to submit all charges that
are supported by prima facie evidence.” Id. See also Office of the Prosecution,
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/OfficeoftheProsecutor (last visited Feb. 26,
2009) (listing the activities the Office of the Prosecutor conducts, such as collecting
evidence, identifying witnesses, exhuming mass graves, preparing indictments, and
presenting prosecutions before the Tribunal).
55
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Key
Figures, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
Numerous statistics are compiled for the ICTY. Id. In addition, there were forty-five
ongoing proceedings as of February 26, 2009. Id. Of these, ten are before the Appeals
Chamber, twenty-one are currently at trial, six are awaiting Trial Chamber, six are at the
pre-trial stage, and two still are at large. Id. Moreover, of the 116 complete proceedings ten
were acquitted, fifty-seven were sentenced, two are awaiting transfer, twenty-nine have
been transferred, twenty-four have served their sentences, thirteen have been referred to
national jurisdiction, twenty indictments have been withdrawn, ten died before transfer to
the Hague, and six died after transfer to the Hague. Id.
56
See supra notes 44–47, 49–51, 53–55 (discussing the provisions needed for the ICTY to
be an effective tribunal).
57
See Holocaust Encyclopedia Genocide Timeline, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/
article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10007095 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). During World War
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targeted top-ranking officials and leaders.58 That decision prompted the
first trial of a former head of state before an international tribunal:
Slobodan Milošević.59
B. The Slobodan Milošević Trial
The ICTY originally indicted Slobodan Milošević on November 22,
2001 for actions committed during the Bosnian War from 1992 through
1995, charging him with twenty-nine counts including grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, crimes against humanity, and
genocide.60 The ICTY also indicted Milošević for his actions in Kosovo
II, genocide was referred to as the crime without a name. Id. In 1944, the U.S. War
Department defined the crime without a name as genocide. Id. When perpetrators in
Bosnia committed the crime of genocide, the world knew of its seriousness because of the
world’s experience in World War II and the Nazi regime. Id.
58
See Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International
Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 563 (2006). As part of its completion strategy, the ICTY
“intensified its focus on top-level officials.” Id. See also Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little,
Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 30, 50 (2003) (stating that to further this goal with regard to rape cases, the ICTY
prosecuted lower ranking people in order to build a case against top officials).
59
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed
Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 804 (2008). Since Milošević,
other heads of state have been charged, such as Jean Kambanda, the Hutu former head of
state of Rwanda, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Charles Taylor, former head of state of Liberia,
Hissene Habre, former head of state of Chad, Alberto Fujimori, former head of state of
Peru, General Augusto Pinochet of Chile, and General Jorge Videla, former head of state of
Argentina. See also ASIL Insights, http://www.asil.org/insigh76.cfm (last visited Feb. 26,
2009) (discussing Milošević as the first head of state to be tried before an international
court).
60
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Indictment, ¶ 32–45 (Nov. 22, 2001)
(Count 1: Genocide; Count 2: Complicity in Genocide; Count 3: Persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds as a Crime against Humanity; Count 4: Extermination as a
Crime against Humanity; Count 5: Murder as a Crime against Humanity; Count 6: Wilful
killing as a Grave Breach of the Geneva Convention of 1949; Count 7: Murder as a
violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 8: Imprisonment as a Crime against
Humanity; Count 9: Torture as a Crime against Humanity; Count 10: Inhumane acts as a
Crime against Humanity; Count 11: Unlawful Confinement as a Grave Breach of the
Geneva Convention of 1949; Count 12: Torture as a Grave Breach of the Geneva
Convention of 1949; Count 13: Wilfully causing great suffering as a Grave Breach of the
Geneva Convention of 1949; Count 14: Torture as a violation of the Laws or Customs of
War; Count 15: Cruel Treatment as a violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 16:
Deportation as a Crime against Humanity; Count 17: Inhumane Acts (Forcible Transfers as
a Crime against Humanity); Count 18: Unlawful Deportation or Transfer as a Grave Breach
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Count 19: Extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly as a
Grave Breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Count 20: Wanton destruction of
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity as a Violation of the Laws or
Customs of War; Count 21: Wilful destruction or wilful damage done to historic
monument and institutions dedicated to education or religion as Violation of the Laws or
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and Croatia, making a grand total of sixty-six counts and seventeen
substantive crimes.61
In February 2002, Milošević’s trial began, and he acted as his own
defense counsel.62 The prosecution’s presentation of its case against
Milošević lasted more than two years.63 During the proceedings,
Milošević made a mockery of the tribunal and consistently used stall
tactics, such as making a long opening statement and submitting a huge
witness list.64 Milošević also presented videos and slide shows, berated
Customs of War; Count 22: Plunder of public or private property as a Violation of the
Laws and Customs of War; Count 23: Murder as a Crime against Humanity; Count 24:
Inhumane acts as a Crime against Humanity; Count 25: Wilfull killing as a Grave Breach of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Count 26: Wilfully causing great suffering as a Grave
Breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Count 27: Murder as a Violation of the Laws or
Customs of War; Count 28: Cruel treatment as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War;
and Count 29: Attacks on civilians as a Violations of the Laws or Customs of war).
61
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-01-50-I, Indictment, ¶ 36 (Sept. 27, 2001). On
September 27, 2001 the ICTY indicted Milošević for his crimes in Croatia. Id. The ICTY
charged him with crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
and violations of the laws or customs of war. Id. Some specific actions included
exterminating or murdering hundreds of Croat and non-Serb civilians, imprisoning
thousands of Croat and non-Serb civilians, perpetrating inhumane living conditions within
detention facilities, beating Croat and non-Serb civilians, forcing labor onto Croat and nonSerb civilians, deporting nearly 200,000 Croat and non-Serb civilians from their homes, and
destroying homes, public and private property. Id. The ICTY initially indicted Milošević
on May 22, 1999 for his actions in Kosovo. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-I,
Indictment, ¶ 92–97 (May 22, 1999). The ICTY charged him with crimes against humanity
and violations of the law or customs of war. Id. Specific crimes he committed were
expelling and displacing hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their homes,
looting and pillaging personal and commercial property belonging to Kosovo Albanians,
harassing, humiliating, degrading Kosovo Albanian civilians through physical and verbal
abuse, and killing scores of people through Kosovo villages. Id.
62
See Marlise Simons, Milosevic’s Lawyers, Frustrated by Client, Ask to be Taken off Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at A7. Milošević defended himself from the beginning of his trial.
Id. When Milošević began to suffer from health issues in September 2005, the United
Nations assigned lawyers to assist in his defense. Id. However, the lawyers asked to be
taken off his case because Milošević would not cooperate and some witnesses said they
would testify only if Milošević represented himself. Id.
63
See Milan Markovic, In the Interests of Justice?: A Critique of the ICTY Trial Court’s
Decision to Assign Counsel to Slobodan Milosevic, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 947, 947 (2005)
(describing how the onerous trial of Milošević was more than the prosecution anticipated);
see also Joanne Williams, Slobodan Milosevic and the Guarantee of Self-Representation, 32 BROOK
J. INT’L L. 553, 554 (2007) (noting that Milošević’s trial lasted more than four years before he
died in his cell on March 11, 2006); Groome, supra note 54, at 934 (asserting that people
criticized the Milošević trial as taking too long, but that there are not alternative procedures
to make the trial more efficient without sacrificing fairness; even trials that were more
efficiently run, after Milošević, took over a year to complete).
64
See Michael P. Scharf, Self-Representation Versus Assignment of Defence Counsel Before
International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 31, 32–33 (2006) [hereinafter Scharf,
Self-Representation Versus Assignment]. Some of the tactics Milošević used were making
long-winded speeches, which could not be restrained by objections to relevance or be

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss3/11

Camier: Controlling the Wrath of Self-Representation: The ICTY's Crucial

2010]

The Wrath of Self-Representation

973

witnesses, and made political speeches.65 Additionally, the ICTY faced
uncontrollable delays that can be attributed to Milošević’s failing health
during his trial.66
Milošević’s health was an additional obstacle for the ICTY because
the former head of state and alleged war criminal died in his cell on
March 11, 2006 from an apparent heart attack, thus escaping judgment,
justice, and accountability.67 Milošević’s death caused much anguish for
subject to cross-examination. Id. Also, Milošević repeatedly challenged the authority of the
court. Id. See also Gregory A. McClelland, A Non-Adversary Approach to International
Criminal Tribunals, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 36 (2002) (asserting that throughout
his trial, Milošević contested every point made by the prosecution, insisted on equal time to
examine all witnesses, attempted to intimidate witnesses, and presented drawn-out
political discourses on cross-examination). Milošević’s tactics forced the prosecution to end
its case early due to a court-imposed deadline. Id. Milošević also succeeded in “hampering
victims from telling the full stories of their sufferings.” Id. See also Mugambi Jouet,
Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the International Criminal Court,
26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 249, 293–94 (2007) (explaining that Milošević also used a
stalling tactic of submitting a witness list comprising over 1,631 witnesses including Bill
Clinton and Tony Blair). The list was five times longer than the prosecution’s witness list.
Id. After Milošević presented his first forty witnesses, he pared down his witness list and
said he only needed to call 199 more, and that was what he considered the absolute
minimum. Id.
65
See Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 918–19
(2003) [hereinafter Scharf, The Legacy]. During his opening argument, Milošević included
numerous gruesome pictures from the 1999 NATO bombing campaign. Id. Milošević
made another vivid presentation during his defense of his actions with Croatia. Id.
Milošević’s cross examinations lasted twice as long as the Prosecution’s direct examination
because of his political rants and abusing witnesses. Id. The Trial Chambers warned
Milošević that he was supposed to be asking the witness questions and not making
speeches. Id.
66
See Jouet, supra note 64, at 294. Milošević’s health unduly delayed the trial because
doctors insisted on long periods of rest for Milošević. Id. See also Marlise Simons, Court
Looks for Ways to Speed Milosevic Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2004, at A9 (discussing how the
ICTY brought in a cardiologist to evaluate Milošević’s health problems which had
continually delayed his trial). Marlise Simons reported that the:
United Nations war crimes tribunal postpone[d] [the] start of Slobodan
Milosevic’s defense until Aug 31, when court reconvene[d] after
summer recess; there have been numerous delays in trial because of
Milosevic’s poor health . . . . Mr. Milosevic, 62, suffer[ed] from high
blood pressure and heart disease and has repeatedly pleaded for more
time to prepare to answer charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The opening of his defense has been postponed
several times . . . .
Marlise Simons, Milosevic’s Defense Delayed 6 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2004, at A6.
67
See Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims’
Reparations, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 189, 196 (2007) (noting that Milošević was in the middle
of his defense when he died on March 11, 2006). Marlise Simons reported:
An autopsy showed that a heart attack killed Slobodan Milosevic . . . .
new evidence emerged that Mr. Milosevic, the former Yugoslav
president found dead in his prison cell bed on Saturday, had been
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his victims, but former ICTY prosecutor Richard Goldstone thinks that
the “ICTY was an appropriate place for him to die, if he were to die
prematurely.”68
The Milošević trial signaled a remarkable success in placing the first
head of state on trial, but caused unrelenting challenges and produced a
great embarrassment of never delivering a judgment.69 Although the
ICTY never completed his trial, Milošević developed a new approach to
self-representation that included various delays, which other defendants
subsequently used in their trials.70
Utilizing this right of selfrepresentation in an exploitative manner became notorious throughout
the ICTY and its trials.71 However, to fully comprehend the criticism
about the use of self-representation in the ICTY, it is important to know
how this right of self-representation came into existence.72

taking medicine not prescribed by his physicians, including an
antibiotic known to diminish or blunt the effect of the medicines he
had been taking for heart and blood-pressure problems.
Milosevic Died of Heart Attack, Autopsy Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2006, at A1.
68
Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, Former Prosecutor, International Criminal
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, in Valparaiso, Ind. (Sept. 24, 2008) (answering a
question about the major mistakes and downfalls of the ICTY with regard to the Milošević
trial). Justice Goldstone also said that “the fact that he died in prison means something.”
Id.
69
Markovic, supra note 63, at 947. Because Milošević was the first head of state to be
tried before an international tribunal, it was hailed as a momentous event. Id. One ICTY
official commented on this success by saying that “Milosevic’s transfer to the Hague is the
capstone of the tribunal’s somewhat improbable rise from the margins of the international
arena to that of a serious international institution.” Id. However, obstacles arose such as
prolonged presentation of the prosecution’s case, the health and resignation of the
Presiding Judge, Richard May, Milošević’s antics of intimidating witnesses and questioning
the legitimacy of the tribunal, and Milošević’s stubbornness to conduct his own defense
while battling significant health problems. Id. One article emphasized that “[t]he early
contender for ‘trial of the century’ ended in embarrassing anticlimax, without a defendant
against whom to deliver judgment.” Recent Publications, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 513, 513 (2008).
70
See supra notes 64–65 (discussing specific tactics such as contesting every point,
making political speeches, and presenting various slide shows and videos).
71
See Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s
Request to Self-Represent, on Counsel’s Motions in Relation to Appointment of Amicus
Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of 16 February 2007, ¶ 24 (May 11, 2007). The
Appeals Chamber granted Krajišnik’s request to represent himself. Id. See also Michael P.
Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in
the War Trials, 39 CASE W. J. INT’L L. 155, 162 (2006) [hereinafter Scharf, Chaos in the
Courtroom] (explaining that only six months after Milošević’s death, Šešelj decided he
would represent himself at his trial).
72
See infra Part II.C (discussing the origins of the ICTY and its importance throughout
various jurisdictions).
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C. Right of Self-Representation
One of the many rights embedded in trials is the right to defend
oneself.73 This right also applied to the trials of the ICTY, as articulated
in its statute and its various interpretations.74 However, defendants may
not take advantage of this right by using it as an opportunity to voice
their own agenda or to make a circus out of the courtroom.75
The ICTY Statute categorized the right to self-representation as one
of the “minimum guarantees” for the accused.76 The article conveying
the right of self-representation, Article 21(4)(d) of the ICTY Statute, also
maintained the right to be represented by counsel.77 A reason for
73
See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161−62
(2000) (holding that defendants need to voluntarily elect that right and to be made aware of
the disadvantages of self-representation). See also U.S. v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 364–65 (3d
Cir. 2004) (noting that defendants should be fully apprised of the risks and difficulties that
come along with pro se defense); Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 580
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is a
fundamental statutory right that is afforded the highest degree of protection. It is a right
which is deeply rooted in our constitutional heritage . . . .”).
74
International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, art. 21(4)(d) (explaining that one of the
rights of the accused is the right to defend himself). See also Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić
and Franko Simatović, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Future Course of Proceedings,
¶ 8 (Apr. 9, 2008) (noting that the right to self-representation is an “indispensable
cornerstone of justice”); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Financing
the Defence of the Accused, ¶ 26 (July 30, 2007) (noting that the ICTY registry refers to
“self-representation [as] an informed choice which an accused makes, accepting the
limitations on his ability to prepare and present a professional defence”).
75
See Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (explaining that the right to selfrepresentation is not absolute). See also U.S. v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir. 1978)
(noting that judges may use their discretion to preserve an orderly courtroom); Payne v.
State, 367 A.2d 1010, 1017 (Del. 1976) (explaining that defendants’ conduct must conform to
orderly standards of the courtroom); People v. Burson, 143 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ill. 1957)
(stating the court has the responsibility to ensure that proceedings will not deteriorate as a
result of improper conduct); State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113, 117 (Kan. 1997) (explaining that
counsel will be appointed to the defendant if the judges feel the defendant’s selfrepresentation would interrupt the court’s business). One article reiterated that “[t]he
strategy, which some of these prominent Serb war crimes indictees have pursued, is not to
take the trial seriously in the legal sense, but to turn it into a kind of propaganda circus—so
to use the courtroom as an opportunity to make propaganda.” Bosnia: Radovan Karadzic
Goes to Court, THAI PRESS REPORTS, Aug. 29, 2008.
76
International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, art. 21(4). The ICTY has also defined
other rights as “minimum guarantees.” Id. These include the right to be quickly informed
about the charges, in detail, in a language he understands, the right to enough time to
prepare a defense, the right “to be tried without undue delay”, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to an interpreter, and the right to remain silent. Id.
77
Id. at art. 21(4)(d). The article also mandates that the defendant be informed of his
right to represent himself or to be represented through legal counsel. Id. The article also
articulates that if a defendant does not have an attorney, the tribunal can assign one to him
without cost to him if he does not have the money to pay for an attorney. Id. See also
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including these two alternatives was that a defendant should have the
right to decide how to approach his trial.78 Although the right to selfrepresentation is well established, the ICTY determined it is a qualified
right, not an absolute right.79
Various courts, including the ICTY, acknowledged the voidable
element of the right of self-representation.80 For example, in England
and Canada, courts restrict the right to self-representation in sexual
assault cases to protect witnesses and victims.81 Moreover, some
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the
Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, ¶ 11 (Nov. 1, 2004)
(noting that article 21(4)(d) created a “binary opposition between representation ‘through
legal assistance’ and representation ‘in person’”).
78
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (holding that the Sixth Amendment implies a defendant’s
personal right to choose self-representation). In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan said
“personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages . . . [the defendant’s] choice must
be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” Id. at
834 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984)
(noting that the self-representation process “affirm[s] the dignity and autonomy of the
accused”); People v. Gordon, 688 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (stating that the
right of self-representation “embodies one of the most cherished ideals of civilization: the
right of an individual to determine his own destiny”); The Accused as Co-Counsel: The Case
for the Hybrid Defense, 12 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 350 (1978) (explaining how a defendant’s
procedural rights incorporate a sense of personal character).
79
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defence, ¶ 20 (May 9, 2003). The
Tribunal cited to a rule of procedure and evidence from the Rwanda Tribunal to support its
statement that assignment of counsel is in conformity with the right of self-representation.
Id. The Tribunal also indicated that the Article in the ICTY tribunal articulating the right to
self-representation is only a starting point, and determined that the right is not absolute.
Id.
80
Milošević, IT-02-54-AR73.7 at ¶ 12. The Tribunal in its decision refers to the Faretta
case, and notes that the United States Supreme Court recognized that because “[t]he right
of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom,” and therefore a
judge “may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in
serious and obstructionist misconduct.” Id. The Tribunal also referred to the decision of
another tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for the precedent that denying a
defendant’s right to self-representation is appropriate when “long adjournments” would
result from such a grant. Id. at n.39.
81
England’s Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act states:
(1) No person charged with a sexual offence may in any criminal
proceedings cross-examine in person a witness who is the
complainant, either—
(a) in connection with that offence, or
(b) in connection with any other offence (of whatever nature)
with which that person is charged in the proceedings.
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999, part II, c. II, §§ 34 (Eng. & Wales). The
Canada Criminal Code states:
(1) In any proceedings against an accused, on application of the
prosecutor or a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, the
accused shall not personally cross-examine the witness[] . . . .
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jurisdictions in the United States do not allow a defendant to use selfrepresentation during an appellate proceeding.82
The ICTY also
recognized that the jurisprudence of civil law countries imposed counsel
upon the accused “in serious criminal cases.”83 Finally, the European
Court of Human Rights held that requiring a defendant to be assisted by
counsel was not incompatible with its Convention.84
Although occasionally various interests trumped the right of selfrepresentation, the right remained prominent.85 Therefore, the ICTY
created a test that balanced the defendant’s right of self-representation
and expeditious trials.86 Even with equilibrium established, criminal
defendants of the ICTY used a defense strategy that involved selfrepresentation and delay tactics to disrupt the courtroom.87
(2) In any proceedings against an accused, on application of the
prosecutor or a witness, the accused shall not personally cross-examine
the witness . . . .
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 486.3(1)–(2) (2009).
82
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000).
The main reason the Court decided that the right to self-representation does not extend to
appellate proceedings is because appellants’ rights in appellate proceedings have been
minimal. Id. Appellants have no right to be present at appellant proceedings and no right
to be present at oral argument. Id. The Court added that a state is free to amend its own
Constitution to include the right of self-representation during appellate proceedings. Id.
83
Milošević, IT-02-54-AR73.7 at ¶ 12 n.38 (citing C. PR. PÉN. arts. 274, 317 (Fr.);
Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil I [BGBl. I] 1074, §140 (F.R.G.); Code D’Instruction Criminelle [Criminal Instruction
Code] of 9 Decembre 1808 art. 294 (Belg.); Arts. 282–83, Code of Criminal Procedure of the
Republic of Korea; Art. 71(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia). See also Šešelj, IT-03-67-PT at ¶ 16–17 (citing Section 731 of the Danish
Administration of Justice Act and the Criminal Procedure Act of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia arts. 13, 71).
84
Croissant v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, 135 (1992). The court added that if a
defendant objects to the number of attorneys, that “will be incompatible with the notion of
a fair trial . . . if, even taking into account a proper margin of appreciation, it lacks relevant
and sufficient justification.” Id.
85
Joseph A. Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on its Edge, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 65 (2003). Colquitt asserts that just because other interests may
supersede the right to self-representation, the courts are mandated to “balance the rights
and interests of defendants against other important rights and interests in a manner fair to
all.” Id.
86
Id. at 127. In order to accomplish justice, striking a proper balance and establishing
procedures need to be ascertained. Id. See also Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Problem of SelfRepresentation at International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64, 66–67 (2006)
[hereinafter Jørgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation] (explaining that the ICTY Trial
Chamber in the Krajišnik case noted that decisions for the grant or denial of selfrepresentation will depend on the factual circumstance). For example, the Trial Chamber
acknowledged that a judge has more discretion to reject a request of self-representation
when the request is made during the trial. Id. at 67.
87
See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-PT, Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-0369-PT, Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion for
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Momčilo Krajišnik, (“Krajišnik”) a former Bosnian Serb politician
whose trial began on February 3, 2004, refused to waver from this
delaying tactic defense strategy.88 Krajišnik disrupted his trial by filing
repeated petitions for various extensions.89 Another less publicized, yet
still groundbreaking, case was that of Vojislav Šešelj (“Šešelj”), the
founder and president of the Serbian Radical Party.90 Šešelj also used the
strategy of self-representation during his trial that began on November 7,
2007.91
Joinder, ¶ 51 (Nov. 10, 2005) (noting the Trial Chamber’s concern that Šešelj’s selfrepresentation may cause further delays). See also Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, supra note
71, at 162 (Šešelj made it clear that he intended to utilize self-representation to disrupt his
trial when he published three books on the eve of his trial: Genocidal Israeli Diplomat
Theodor Meron, In the Jaws of the Whore Del Ponte, and The Lying Hague Homosexual, Geoffrey
Nice.).
88
See
The
Hague
Justice
Portal,
Krajišnik
Granted
Self-Representation,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/7/577.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009)
(discussing how the ICTY Appeals Chamber allowed Krajišnik to exercise his right of selfrepresentation). See also Krajišnik (IT-00-39) Case Information Sheet, http://www.un.org/
icty/glance/Krajišnik.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (explaining that the ICTY charged
Krajišnik with two counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and one
count of violations of the laws or customs of war); Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-0030-T, Judgement, ¶ 1179 (Sept. 27, 2006) (stating that the Trial Chamber found Krajišnik
guilty and sentenced him to twenty-seven years in jail).
89
Krajišnik submitted an Appellate Brief to the Tribunal but exceeded the 30,000 word
limit. Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Request by Momčilo
Krajišnik for Extension of Time to Comply with Appeal Brief Word Limit (Jan. 7, 2008).
The Appeals Chambers considered the fact that Krajišnik had the difficult task of
shortening his arguments and that he wanted to use lawyers to help him; the court held
that approving his petition would help facilitate a fair and expeditious appeal. Id. See also
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on “Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time for Filing Notice of Appeal Pending Translation of the Judgment into the Language of
the Convicted Person” (Feb. 1, 2007). Krajišnik filed a petition for “an extension of time for
the filing of the Notice of Appeal until the Appellant has received a translation of the
Judgment convicting him in his own language,” and “requested that [he] be granted 75
days following the provision of the Judgement in a language he understands for the filing
of his Notice of Appeal.” Id. In denying the petition, the Appeals Chambers noted that
appellants are allowed only thirty days to file a Notice of Appeal and the Pre-Appeal Judge
already granted an extension of time on three occasions, which exceeded “what has been
granted in similar circumstances in other cases.” Id.
90
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Indictment (Jan. 15, 2003). Vojislav Šešelj
was the President of the Serbian Radical Party and the ICTY accused him of crimes against
humanity such as persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds and inhumane acts
of forcible transfer. Id. Furthermore, he has been accused of violations of the laws or
customs of war such as murder, torture, cruel treatment, wanton destruction of villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity, destruction or willful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion or education, and plunder of public or private property.
Id. Also, Šešelj has some legal education, foreshadowing his exercise of his right of selfrepresentation. Id.
91
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Initial Appearance Transcript at 6, ¶1–4
(Feb. 26, 2003). Šešelj said: “[i]t is possible that I will engage an assistant and a legal
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The recently-developed defense scheme of delaying the trial and
embarrassing the tribunal became a major obstacle for the ICTY during
its struggle to balance efficient trials against defendants’ rights.92 The
copious number of motions filed and use of the courtroom as a personal
soapbox undermined these trials.93 The tribunal used various methods,
including assignment of counsel, the assignment of amicus curiae, and
the assignment of standby counsel, to control inefficiencies of selfrepresentation.94
D. ICTY’s Control Mechanisms for the Right of Self-Representation
International law permitted the assignment of counsel to an
unwilling defendant and acknowledged the necessity to safeguard the
integrity of the proceedings.95 The ICTY used three main control
mechanisms: assignment of counsel, assignment of standby counsel, and
assignment of amicus curiae.96

advisor who will never appear on my behalf in this courtroom. They will never appear in
this courtroom. I retain this exclusivity of appearing in the courtroom on the side of the
accused.” Id. See also Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s
Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defence (May 9,
2003) (discussing how the prosecution wanted counsel for Šešelj for fear of his delaying the
trial; however, this motion was denied); Can Karpat, The Vojislav Šešelj Trial: Another
Judicial Farce Begins, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article =1145 (Nov. 29, 2006)
(explaining that Šešelj used such tactics as demanding all documents be in print form
because he was afraid a computer would electrocute him; Šešelj also disrupted his
proceedings by demanding that judges remove their robes because they looked like
medieval inquisitors, and refused a court-imposed lawyer because they wore traditional
wigs which looked like “a bird’s nest on [the] head”).
92
See supra notes 87–91 (discussing how disruptive defendants took advantage of the
ICTY).
93
See supra notes 65, 89 (discussing various tactics that self-represented defendant used).
94
See infra Part II.D (discussing and defining the ICTY’s three main control mechanisms
for defiant defendants).
95
See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel
Motion to Withdraw (Nov. 2, 2000). The court held that it can assign counsel over the
protest of the self-represented defendant. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the
Assignment of Defense Counsel, ¶ 13 (Nov. 1, 2004) (holding that the assignment of
counsel is permitted “on the grounds that a defendant’s self-representation is substantially
and persistently obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of his trial”).
96
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel’s
Motion for Withdrawal (Dec. 7, 2004). This decision illustrates the option of assignment of
counsel. Id. See also Šešelj, IT-03-67-PT. This decision illustrates the option of standby
counsel. Id. See also ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 74, (Nov. 4, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_Rev42_
en.pdf (allowing the ICTY to assign amicus curiae to defendants as it sees fit).
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The first mechanism was the assignment of defense counsel, who
essentially presented the case for the defendant.97 For assignment of
counsel, the ICTY balanced the defendant’s personal right and choice of
pro se litigation against the tribunal’s interest in achieving a fair and
expeditious trial.98 However, once the ICTY decided to assign counsel,
the assignment prohibited the defendant from making submissions or
questioning witnesses.99 The assigned counsel also made submissions on
law or fact and acted in the best interest of the accused.100 Nevertheless,
the ICTY judges thought this control mechanism was unfair and

See Mikhail Wladimiroff, Former Heads of State on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 949, 967
(2005). In an inquisitorial system, there is a provision for mandatory defense counsel. Id.
However, the ICTY is an adversarial system and there is no such requirement. Id. In the
inquisitorial system, the accused instructs his advocate about the nature of his defense, but
in the adversarial system defense counsel has an obligation to “[put on] a case.” Id.
98
See Göran Sluiter, Karadžić on Trial, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 617, 619–20 (2008) [hereinafter
Sluiter, Karadžić on Trial]. Sluiter asserts that the ICTY’s decision in the Šešelj case retracts
from the ICTY providing a clear guideline for assignment of counsel to restrain the right of
self-representation. Id. Sluiter also offers his three factors that need to be considered for a
guideline: the accused needs to be informed about the rules of self-representation, the
court would have to assess if violation of self-representation rules was in bad-faith and if
the court gave the accused a warning about his conduct. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Case No. IT-96-23/IT-96-23/1, Decision on the Request of the Accused Radomir Kovac to
Allow Mr. Milan Vujin to Appear as Co-Counsel Acting Pro Bono, ¶ 9 (Mar. 14, 2000)
(noting that the ICTY held that “the Chambers possess an inherent power to control the
proceedings in such a way as to ensure that justice is done and to deal with conduct which
interferes with the Tribunal's administration of justice”); Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT96-21, Order on the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel Due to Confilict [sic] of Interest, ¶ 8
(June 24, 1999) (noting the ICTY’s duty to “control its proceedings in such a way as to
ensure that justice is done and, particularly in relation to matters of practice, that the trial
proceeds fairly and expeditiously[]”).
99
See Wladimiroff, supra note 97, at 968. Once a court assigns counsel it would have to
decide how involved the defendant would be in his defense. Id. The first option is to
prohibit the defendant from doing anything, thus preventing his presentation of the case.
Id. The other approach would be to allow the defendant to make submissions and question
witnesses. Id. This would ultimately lead to the assigned counsel acting essentially as
amicus curiae. Id.
100
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on the Modalities to be Followed
by Court Assigned Counsel (Sept. 3, 2004). In addition, the assigned counsel will prepare
and examine witnesses, seek orders from the Court that are necessary to the case, including
subpoenas, and discuss the case and listen to the defendant but still determine what route
to take the case. Id. Furthermore, the accused may be afforded the opportunity, if
approved by the Trial Chamber, to participate actively in the case, such as by examining a
witness after counsel has already examined the witness. Id. See also Prosecutor v. Krajišnik,
Case No. IT-00-39-T, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajišnik’s Request to Proceed
Unrepresented by Counsel, ¶ 3 (Aug. 18, 2005) (allowing an exception to its usual rule and
allowing Krajišnik to question the witness after his counsel).
97
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established another version of the assignment of counsel in the Šešelj
case.101
The ICTY judges utilized another method, the standby counsel
model.102 This allowed the accused to defend himself with counsel to
assist him with the technical aspects of the trial, but not with formulating
the arguments.103 Standby counsel also helped the defendant prepare his
defense, remained in the courtroom, addressed the court when the
defendant requested, and questioned witnesses if the Trial Chamber
ordered it.104 In addition, standby counsel took over the trial if the
101
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defense (May 9, 2003). Soon after its
decision on assignment of counsel for Milošević, the ICTY changed its perspective on the
assignment of counsel and opted instead for assignment of standby counsel. Id. See also
Wladimiroff, supra note 97, at 968. (The difference in opinions is based on the composition
of judges for each decision. Id. The judges in Šešelj had “stronger roots in common law
jurisdictions,” whereas the judges in Milošević “had more ties with civil law jurisdictions.”
Id. The common law jurisdiction focuses more on the rights of the accused, whereas civil
law jurisdictions emphasize the interest of justice. Id.
102
See Šešelj, No. IT-03-67, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defense (May 9, 2003) (discussing the new
approach of assigning standby counsel).
103
See Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation Before
International Criminal Tribunals, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 721 (2004) [hereinafter ”Jørgensen,
Right of the Accused”]. Jørgensen defines standby counsel’s role as:
–to assist the Accused in the preparation of his case during the pre-trial
phase whenever so requested by the Accused;
–to assist the Accused in the preparation and presentation of his case at
trial whenever so requested by the Accused;
–to receive copies of all court documents, filings and disclosed
materials that are received by or sent to the Accused; to be present in
the courtroom during the proceedings;
–to be engaged actively in the substantive preparation of the case and
to participate in the proceedings, in order always to be prepared to
take over from the Accused at trial . . . ;
–to address the Court whenever so requested by the Accused or the
Chamber;
–to offer advice or make suggestions to the Accused as counsel sees fit,
in particular on evidential and procedural issues;
–as a protective measure in the event of abusive conduct by the
Accused, to put questions to witnesses, in particular sensitive or
protected witnesses, on behalf of the Accused if so ordered by the Trial
Chamber, without depriving the Accused of his right to control the
content of the examination;
–in exceptional circumstances to take over the defence from the
Accused at trial should the Trial Chamber find, following a warning,
that the Accused is engaging in disruptive conduct or conduct
requiring his removal from the courtroom under Rule 80(B).
Id.
104
See Šešelj, No. IT-03-67, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defense (May 9, 2003). Other duties of standby
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defendant became too disruptive.105 But, the ICTY also assigned amicus
curiae to assist the court.106
Thus, the amicus curiae assisted the court.107 The amicus curiae was
not a part of the defense.108 Rather, the amicus curiae’s primary duty
was to supply the court with information about defense issues.109
Moreover, in order to ensure that the judge obtained all essential
information to the case, the amicus curiae provided defendants with
additional arguments.110 Moreover, the amicus curiae made submissions

counsel are to help the accused prepare for the pre-trial proceedings, to receive all
materials, such as court documents or filings, and to advise the defendant as counsel sees
fit. Id. Furthermore, with regard to questioning witnesses when the court orders it, the
accused still has the “right to control the content of the examination.” Id. Also, the counsel
is bound in the same way as working with other defendants and communicates freely with
those defendants. Id.
105
See id. The court will order the standby counsel to take over the cases in exceptional
circumstances. Id. The court must also issue the accused a warning about his disruptive
behavior. Id. See also Wladimiroff, supra note 97, at 968 (asserting that the ICTR appointed
standby counsel in the Barayagwiza case after the defendant boycotted and disrupted the
trial).
106
See ICTY R. of P. & Evid. 74. The rule states: “[a] Chamber may, if it considers it
desirable for the proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a State,
organization or person to appear before it and make submissions on any issue specified by
the Chamber.” Id. On August 30, 2001, the Trial Chamber ordered the Registrar to assign
amicus curiae for Milošević. See also Maury D. Shenk, David S. Lorello & Meredith A.
Rathbone, International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 37 INT’L
LAW. 551, 554 n.23 (2003) (citing United Nations, Case Information Sheet: Milošević Case
(“Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia”), Jan. 21, 2003, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_
milosevic/cis/en/cis_milosevic_slobodan.pdf). On September 6, 2001, the Registrar
named Steven Kay, Kranislav Tapusković, and Michail Wladimiroff as amici curiae. Id. On
October 10, 2002, the Trial Chamber removed Michail Wladimiroff as amicus curiae. Id.
On November 22, 2002, it assigned Timothy McCormack as the third amicus curiae. Id.
107
See Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, International Humanitarian Law from Nuremberg to Rome:
The Weighty Precedents of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV.
273, 301 (2002). Amicus curiae is defined as “friend of the court.” Id. Also, the amicus
curiae does not assist the defendant directly. Id.
108
See Jarinde Temminch Tuinstra, Assisting an Accused to Represent Himself, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 47, 56 (2006). Tuinstra asserts that the ICTY judges emphasized that standby
counsel was not the same as amicus curiae. Id. Standby counsel works exclusively with
the defendant and “should safeguard a fair and expeditious trial to the accused, even if the
accused opposes their appointment.” Id.
109
Id. at 54. In a courtroom it may be hard to decipher who is counsel and who is amicus
curiae. Id. But, counsel’s duty is to adamantly defend the accused. Id. This primary
function of counsel is extremely different than the role that amicus curiae fulfill. Id.
110
Id. at 53. A main reason why amicus curiae may have to articulate other arguments
for the defendants is because most of the defendants are not trained as lawyers, and thus,
are unable to comprehend all that is required for a judge to make a decision. Id. For
example, Milošević, even though considered a lawyer, did not meet the standards for
Defense Counsel under Rule 44 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Id.
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regarding motions, objected to evidence, or pointed out exculpatory or
mitigating evidence.111
The ICTY utilized these various methods in an attempt to curtail
insubordinate defendants.112 Each method tried to maintain the right to
self-representation while still assisting the court.113 Yet, none of these
control mechanisms provided the perfect solution for the ICTY.114 Even
with these control mechanisms, the disruptive defense strategy haunted
the ICTY again with Karadžić’s threats to use this strategy.115
E. Karadžić : His Arrest and Pending Trial
On July 24, 1995, the ICTY indicted Karadžić for the crimes he
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina between May 13, 1992 until the
day of his indictment.116 Just a few months later, on November 16, 1995,
111
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Inviting Designation of
Amicus Curiae (Aug. 30, 2001). In addition, the amicus curiae can act in any other way that
the primary counsel deems appropriate in order to guarantee a fair trial. Id. See also
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Concerning Amici Curiae (Jan. 11,
2002). The amicus curiae also assists the court by illustrating to the Trial Chamber any
defenses that are available to the defendant. Id. Furthermore, amicus curiae can make
submissions about relevance. Id.
112
See supra notes 98–111 (discussing the assignment of standby counsel, assignment of
counsel, and assignment of amicus curiae).
113
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Inviting Designation of
Amicus Curiae (Aug. 30, 2001) (noting that the ICTY needed to take into consideration the
fact that defendants had a right of self-representation). Id. See also Prosecutor v. Norman,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-125, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for SelfRepresentation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court (June 8, 2004)
(illustrating that when assigning standby counsel to Norman, the court took into
consideration the fact that he requested self-representation late into his trial). The ICTY
held:
We have to act in accordance with the Statute and our Rules which, in
any event, reflect the position under customary international law,
which is that the accused has a right to counsel, but he also has a right
not to have counsel. He has a right to defend himself, and it is quite
clear that he has chosen to defend himself.
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript at 18 (Aug. 30, 2001).
114
See infra Part III.C (discussing the flaws and perfections of each control mechanism
and the ICTY’s treatment of self-representation).
115
See infra Part II.E (discussing how the ICTY will again struggle with trying to control
self-represented defendants if Karadžić uses the tactics displayed in previous cases).
116
Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment (July 24, 1995). ICTY charged
Karadžić with Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, such as detention facilities, targeting of
political leaders, intellectuals, and professionals, deportation, shelling of civilian
gatherings, appropriation and plunder of property, destruction of property, destruction of
sacred sites, unlawful confinement of civilians as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention
of 1949, outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of the laws or customs of war,
shelling of civilian gatherings as a violation of the laws or customs of war, destruction of
sacred sites as a violation of the laws or customs of war, extensive destruction or property
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the ICTY indicted Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (“Mladić”) for the
massacre at Srebrenica.117 Karadžić and Mladić planned the ethnic
cleansing of the town of Srebrenica, and their troops killed between 7000
and 8000 men and boys.118 In addition, these indictments served the
important purpose of making peace possible in the Balkan region.119

as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, appropriation and plunder of
property as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and as a violation of the laws
or customs of war, Sarajevo sniping as a violation of the laws or customs of war, hostages
as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and as a violation of the laws or
customs of war, and human shields as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention of 1949
and as a violation of the laws or customs of war. Id.
117
See Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Indictment (Nov. 16,
1995) (indicting Karadžić and Mladić for Srebrenica). See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No.
IT-98-33, Judgement, ¶ 2 (Apr. 19, 2004) (stating that Srebrenica is located in eastern
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United Nations designated it a safe area during the conflict);
Nancy G. Abudu et al., Human Rights, 42 INT’L LAW. 755, 765 (2008) (noting that these 7000
to 8000 men died all in one day); Claus Kreβ, The International Court of Justice and the
Elements of the Crime of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 628 (2007) (explaining that there was
a total of 40,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica before the slaughter); Daryl Mundis,
Introductory Note to ICTY: Prosecutor v. Krstić, 40 I.L.M. 1343 (Nov. 2001) (explaining that
the purpose of the massacre was to destroy the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica
and eliminate the possibility of the populations reestablishing itself); Solomon Shinerock,
United Nations Update, 14 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 51, 51 (2007) (“The U.N.’s International
Court of Justice . . . recently acquitted the Serbian government of complicity in the 1995
massacre of 8,000 Muslim Bosnians in Srebrenica.”); Meg Bortin, Taking Up a Shovel to
Expose Genocide in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at A8 (describing the genocide at
Srebrenica as “the worst massacre in Europe since World War II”).
118
See Katherine G. Southwick, Srebrenica as Genocide? The Krstic Decision and the Language
of the Unspeakable, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 188, 193–94 (2005). Karadžić issued a
directive to his
forces to “complete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa as
soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals
in the two enclaves. By planned and well-thought out combat
operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no
hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srbrenica.”
Id. The massacre followed a systematic plan. See also Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-9833-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 84 (Aug. 2, 2001). The ICTY describes one specific instance:
The men were first taken to empty schools or warehouses. After being
detained there for some hours, they were loaded onto buses or trucks
and taken to another site for execution. Usually, the execution fields
were in isolated locations. The prisoners were unarmed and, in many
cases, steps had been taken to minimise resistance, such as
blindfolding them, binding their wrists behind their backs with
ligatures or removing their shoes. Once at the killing fields, the men
were taken off the trucks in small groups, lined up and shot. Those
who survived the initial round of gunfire were individually shot with
an extra round, though sometimes only after they had been left to
suffer for a time. Immediately afterwards, and sometimes even during
the executions, earth moving equipment arrived and the bodies were
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In 1998, after the conflict ended in Bosnia, Karadžić disappeared
until July 21, 2008, the day of his arrest.120 At the time of his arrest,
Karadžić was at the top of the ICTY’s most-wanted list.121 On July 30,
2008, agents transferred Karadžić to the ICTY.122 As anticipated, the
ICTY encountered challenges with the efficiency of his proceedings.123
Before Karadžić’s move to the ICTY, he attempted an appeal, thus
delaying his transfer.124 Also, Karadžić employed another stall tactic at
his initial hearing on July 31, 2008 by exercising his right to use a thirtyday delay before entering his plea.125 Moreover, during Karadžić’s
buried, either in the spot where they were killed or in another nearby
location.
Id.
See Richard Goldstone, Former Prosecutor, ICTY, Address at Valparaiso University
School of Law: The Current State of International Criminal Law (Sept. 24, 2008). Goldstone
said that the indictments stopped Karadžić from attending the Dayton Accords because
Bosnia would not have gone to Dayton and sat in the same room with him. Id. Thus, the
parties that did attend the Dayton Accords eventually agreed on a peace resolution. Id.
120
See Radovan Karadžić’s ‘Novel’ Idea for Disguise, STATESMAN, July 31, 2008. Karadžić
was in hiding for thirteen years before his arrest. Id. The author asserts that Karadžić may
have stolen the idea for his disguise from a book about him written by Mirjana Djurdjevic.
Id. Karadžić disguised himself as a psychiatrist working in Belgrade, changed his name,
and grew a long white beard. Id. In addition, Mladic is still at large. Id. See also Dan
Bilefsky & Marlise Simons, Top Bosnian War Figure Held Serb Leader Karadzic Arrested After
13 Years on the Run, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 2008, at 6 (discussing how Karadžić was “one of the
world’s most-wanted war criminals” and that his arrest is an important occasion for the
victims).
121
See Warren Zimmerman, Impressions of Karadžić, Frontline Online: The World’s Most
Wanted Man, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/Karadzic/radovan/
impressions.html. Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, describes Karadžić
as “a man obsessed by the imagery of violence,” who is mad, and “seemed to [be] a man
who needed psychiatric care, a person without moral compass or restraint.” Id. The
second highest ranking official who is still at large is Ratko Mladić. Id. See also Frontline
Online: The World’s Most Wanted Man, Indicting the Top Leaders, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/Karadžić/trial/indicted.html (indicating that Mladić was
Karadžić’s military commander and the ICTY considered them its most wanted criminals).
122
See Peter Finn, Serbs Send Karadžić to War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, July 30, 2008.
On the night of his transfer, masked secret service agents took Karadžić. Id. Karadžić’s
arrest sparked controversy in Serbia and rallies gathered. Id. It was estimated that about
15,000 people fled to the streets. Id. See also Bruno Waterfield, Momentous Day as Karadžić
Faces Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 30, 2008, at 15 (stating that on July 31, 2008, Karadžić
appeared in the ICTY for his initial appearance).
123
See infra notes 124–26 (discussing Karadžić’s delay of his transfer to the Hague, filing
an extension before entering his plea, and refusal to enter a plea).
124
See Karadzic Appeal Delays Trial Transfer, 7 DAYS, July 29, 2008. Karadžić planned to
appeal his transfer. Id. He said that he mailed his appeal from a remote post office just
before the deadline. Id. It was also alleged that Karadžić ordered his legal team to delay
his transfer to the Hague for as a long as possible. Id. But, the appeal never arrived. Id.
125
Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5, Initial Appearance Transcript (July 31, 2008).
Karadžić preferred not to enter a plea at his initial appearance, but wanted to see what
happened in the next thirty days. Id. The wait-and-see was a response to the amended
119

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 11

986

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

second appearance, he refused to enter a plea.126 Finally, Karadžić
decided to represent himself and began his defense by filing various
motions contesting the appointment of the judges.127
As early as his initial appearances, Karadžić used the ICTY as a
forum to make his viewpoints known by opining about past unfair
trials.128 Moreover, during his second appearance, he acted defiantly and
made derogatory comments about the ICTY.129 Karadžić also made
ridiculous accusations against a former prosecutor of the ICTY, Richard
Goldstone, and a former United States Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, alleging that they told him they would not arrest him if he
disappeared.130
indictment and Karadžić was notified that after the thirty days he would have to enter a
plea on either the operative indictment or the amended one. Id. Karadžić agreed to a
second appearance scheduled for August 29, 2008. Id.
126
See Ed Harris, Karadžić Refused to Enter Plea, EVENING STANDARD, August 29, 2008, at
30 (noting that Karadžić did not enter a plea for his eleven counts and that the tribunal
judge followed court rules and entered a plea of not guilty on Karadžić’s behalf).
127
See Peter Finn, Karadzic Vows Vigorous Defense, WASH. POST, July 31, 2008. Finn
reported that Karadžić vowed to defend himself “as I would defend myself against any
natural catastrophe.” Id. Karadžić attacked the appointment of the judges and accused
Judge Alphons Orie of having “‘a personal interest’ in convicting him.” See also Karadzic
Wants Judge Dismissed, ALJAZEERA.NET, Aug. 22, 2008. Karadžić also accused the ICTY of
being incapable of giving him an impartial trial. Id. Finally, Karadžić listed a number of
cases that Judge Orie had been involved with, including setting the sentence of twentyseven years for Momčilo Krajišnik and being the judge at the ongoing trial of Šešelj. Id.
128
See Radovan Karadzic to Face New War Crimes Charges Soon, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 17,
2008. Karadžić said that he refused to be a passive object in court and that “he’s not just
defending himself, but everyone who suffered in the former Yugoslavia as well as the
leaders of small nations who may one day find themselves similarly judged.” Id. Karadžić
proceeded to opine about the ICTY’s previous trials by saying:
I cannot allow such a major trial, you’ve never had a trial like this and
never will have, that this be an opportunity to just make it look like a
fair trial. . . . And just as a human cannot be half girl, half mermaid, or
half fish, this either has to be a fair trial or no trial at all.
Id.
129
See Mike Corder, Karadžić Still Defiant, SUNDAY MAIL, Aug. 31, 2008, at 54. A specific
derogatory comment Karadžić said was that the ICTY “is representing itself falsely as a
court of the international community, whereas it is in fact a court of NATO whose aim is to
liquidate me.” Id. See also Radovan Refuses to Answer to War Crimes Charges, THAI PRESS
REPORTS, Sept. 1, 2008 (noting that once the judge entered the not guilty plea, Karadžić
asked if he could hold the judge to his word of not guilty).
130
See Richard Holbrooke, The Night I Pushed Karadzic for Peace, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 11,
2008, at 22 (noting that Karadžić is making up rumors about a deal being struck between
Karadžić and Madeleine Albright agreeing, in exchange for his disappearance, that NATO
would not seek to arrest him). See also Karadžić Wants Holbrooke Called, INDEP., Aug. 7, 2008,
at 30 (discussing how Karadžić applied to the ICTY to have Richard Holbrooke summoned
to the tribunal to testify about the secret 1996 deal that Karadžić would never stand trial for
war crimes if he left politics); Marlise Simons, Karadžić Makes Claims of Poor Treatment and a
U.S. Deal to Avoid Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008, at A8 (explaining that Karadžić contended
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Karadžić’s arrest symbolized an achievement for the ICTY.131 But,
Karadžić demonstrated various disruptive techniques in his appearances
at the ICTY.132 These tactics mimicked those of past self-represented
defendants and presented the same issues the ICTY dealt with in those
trials.133 Therefore, Karadžić forced the ICTY to confront these problems
again.134 In addition to the ICTY’s major undertaking of reconciling the
Balkan region, defendants’ and Karadžić’s tactics placed another burden
on the tribunal.135
The ICTY developed from a gruesome war and it conducted high
profile trials.136 Various defendants in these cases established a way to
manipulate the right of self-representation and the mechanisms used to
control it.137 Accordingly, Part III of this Note analyzes why defendants
opt for this defense, why the ICTY needs to control these defendants,
why the current control mechanisms are deficient, and what implications
may arise if this problem is not resolved in Karadžić’s trial.138
III. ANALYSIS
Part III suggests that the ICTY needs a new mechanism for
controlling its disruptive, self-represented defendants.139 Part III.A
explains why the defendants use the strategy of self-representation.140
Part III.A also focuses on a defendant’s goal of delaying trials, making a
that the U.S. State Department urged the Tribunal’s chief prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, to
refrain from looking for Karadžić and to withdraw the indictment; Albright, Holbrooke,
and Goldstone deny all these deals and allegations).
131
See supra notes 120–21 (discussing Karadžić’s thirteen years at large and his position
atop the ICTY’s most wanted list).
132
See supra notes 124–28 (discussing how Karadžić emulated disruptive tactics used by
previous self-represented defendants).
133
See supra notes 124–26 (discussing Karadžić’s delay of his extradition and refusal to
enter a plea).
134
See supra notes 124–30 (discussing the situations where the ICTY had to handle
Karadžić’s antics).
135
See supra notes 40–42, 64–65, 89, 91 (discussing the reasons why the United Nations
established the ICTY and how defendants manipulate the right to undermine the tribunal).
136
See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the history that led to the establishment of the ICTY).
137
See supra Parts II.C–D (explaining self-representation and the mechanisms used to
control defendants who abuse the right of self-representation).
138
See infra Part III (discussing why defendant’s use self-representation, why the ICTY
needs to control these defendants, the strengths and weaknesses of each attempt, and the
implication if self-represented defendants are not controlled).
139
See infra Parts III.A–D (demonstrating why defendants abuse their self-representation
rights, why the ICTY needs to control them, why the ICTY’s current control mechanisms
are deficient, and what the future implications could be if the problem is not addressed in
the upcoming Karadžić trial).
140
See infra Part III.A (discussing the advantages gained by the defendant if he represents
himself).
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mockery of the ICTY, and criticizing the illegitimacy of the ICTY.141
Next, Part III.B evaluates why it is crucial for the ICTY to restrain the
right to self-representation by centering on the need for efficiency,
fairness, and effectiveness.142 Further, Part III.B discusses the policy
behind the balance of self-representation and the court’s right to have a
non-disruptive trial.143 Part III.C then analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of the ICTY’s treatment of self-representation and its control
mechanisms.144 Finally, Part III.D discusses the implications for future
regional criminal tribunals if an appropriate procedure is not finalized
during the Karadžić trial.145
A. Reasons ICTY Defendants Opt to Self-Represent
Many high profile defendants, including ICTY defendants, redefine
self-representation when they incorporate it into their defense
strategies.146 One of the purposes is to delay the trial by filing

See infra Part III.A (analyzing the underlying reasons why defendants opt for selfrepresentation).
142
See infra Part III.B (discussing why the ICTY needs to control the self-represented
defendant, mainly to ensure efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness).
143
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the public policy behind the balancing of interests of
defendants and the tribunal).
144
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the ICTY’s treatment of self-representation and the
strengths and weaknesses of each control mechanism, such as assignment of standby
counsel, assignment of counsel, and assignment of amicus curiae).
145
See infra Part III.D (discussing what could happen if Karadžić is not controlled in his
trial).
146
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Initial Appearance Transcript at 6, ¶ 1–4
(Feb. 26, 2003). Šešelj said: “It is possible that I will engage an assistant and a legal advisor
who will never appear on my behalf in this courtroom. They will never appear in this
courtroom. I retain this exclusivity of appearing in the courtroom on the side of the
accused.” Id. See also Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on
Prosecution’s Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of the Decision of 28 February
2008, ¶ 7–9 (Mar. 11, 2008) (explaining that Krajišnik, although representing himself, can be
assisted by counsel; but the Appeals Chambers clarified that their arguments must be
consistent); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-I-PT, Transcript at 5, ¶ 6–8 (July 3,
2001) (noting that the court explained to Milošević that an initial appearance is not the
place to start his defense, but that he would have ample opportunity to defend himself);
Kristina Dell, Why Karadžić Wants No Lawyer, TIME, July 29, 2008, http://www.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,1827424,00.html (noting that Mahatma Ghandi, Nelson
Mandela, Fidel Castro, Slobodan Milošević, Charles Taylor, Vojislav Šešelj, and Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed all represented themselves And that Karadžić is representing himself
just to “enter into history”). Other reasons why defendants represent themselves is to
reject the court, tell their stories (better than anyone else), to play a hero to supporters, to
delay and disrupt the proceedings, and to avoid legal procedure. Id. See also Karadžić to
Conduct his Own Defense, CHINA DAILY, July 24, 2008 (explaining that although Karadžić
will represent himself, he will have legal counsel in Serbia helping him).
141
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unnecessary motions.147
In addition, self-representation gives
defendants an opportunity to manipulate the ICTY in order to fulfill selfserving goals.148 Finally, the defendants use self-representation in an
attempt to criticize or embarrass the ICTY.149
First, defendants use self-representation to delay and disrupt trials
because the legal procedures in place at the ICTY compliment their
motives.150 A defendant’s motive for filing various motions is to delay
trials, but also to frustrate the prosecution as well as disrupt the
momentum of the prosecution’s case.151 The wait between the filing of a
motion and the rendering of a decision essentially acts as a time-out from
the trial, thus allowing defendants to distract the prosecution from the
pending case. 152 Once the Chamber decides, it also has the effect of

147
See Eleanor Hall, Concern over Karadzic’s Plan to Represent Himself, WORLD TODAY, July
24, 2008. This article interviews Gideon Boas, former ICTY senior legal officer; he
explained how Milošević’s trial lasted so long. Id. He explained that Milošević’s case was
so complicated that one person could not handle it. Id. Karadžić will be able to obstruct a
fair and expeditious process by complaining “that he’s at a significant disadvantage vis-àvis a prosecution office with tens of millions of dollars behind them and all sorts of
resources.” Id. Boas explained that this type of complaint is a big risk to the ICTY. Id.
148
See Adam M. Smith, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future of International Criminal
Justice, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 563, 571 (2004) (giving an example that the ICTY’s defendant
Dusko Tadic hindered the prosecution’s case because he failed to recognize the ICTY’s
authority). See also Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript at 2806, ¶ 2–3
(Apr. 10, 2002) (noting that Milošević said: “I cannot appoint a lawyer, an attorney for
myself, in front of an institution that I don’t recognise.”).
149
See Eileen Simpson, Stop to the Hague: Internal Versus External Factors Suppressing the
Advancement of the Rule of Law in Serbia, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1255, 1276–77 (2005). Milošević
somewhat succeeded in reducing confidence of the ICTY by challenging its legitimacy. Id.
Milošević also converted the idea of justice into injustice because of his consistent
degrading. Id. Furthermore, the ICTY never countered these assertions, furthering a lack
of support. Id.
150
See infra notes 151–54 (discussing how the ICTY’s procedures helped the defendants
delay their trials).
151
Cf. Mark C. Fleming, Appellate Review in International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 111, 144 (2002) (discussing how interlocutory appeals disrupt the momentum of the
case). The filing of excessive motions can be analogized to interlocutory appeals because
both disrupt the case. Id.
152
Cf. Robert A. Creamer, Lateral Screening After Ethics 2000, 787 PRACTISING L. INST. 111,
123 (2008). This article discusses motions dealing with screening and disqualifying
attorneys. Id. It notes, however, that the lawyers and judges waste a great deal of time
when resolving motions that do not pertain to the merits of the case. Id. Moreover, the
article addresses that dealing with motions inevitably delays the conclusion of pending
issues. Id. Therefore, the filing of excessive or unfounded motions accomplishes the same
negative results of delay and a waste of time. Id. Paul L. Friedman, Proposed Revisions to
Rule Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, SM090 A.L.I-A.B.A 1151 (2007). This article discusses
that many unfounded motions are filed in order to burden the opposing side and delay the
proceeding. Id. Again, motions filed in the ICTY can be analogized to motions filed under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the same bad motives stimulate the filing. Id.
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increasing the prosecution’s workload because it must abide or respond
to the Chamber’s recommendation.153 Ultimately, some of the ICTY’s
procedures allow for delays that preoccupy the prosecution, distract it
from the case at issue, and satisfy the defendant’s desire to disrupt the
trial.154 A defendant’s right of self-representation, however, not only
allows him to delay the trial, it also produces additional benefits.155
The benefits and advantages defendants gain through representing
themselves prompts them to exercise this right.156 First, the right of selfrepresentation allows defendants to hinder the exposure of the truth by
twisting the facts.157 Therefore, if the defendant succeeds in altering the
truth, then it could curtail the victims’ rehabilitation.158 This is mainly
153
See generally Milošević, Slobodan (IT-02-54) Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia,
http://www.icty.org/case/slobodan_milosevic/4 (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). During the
Milošević trial the Trial Chamber made nineteen orders during 2006, forty-five in 2005,
fifty-two in 2004, thirty-one in 2003, forty in 2002, and twenty-three in 2001. Id. With
regard to decisions, there were ten in 2006, twenty-seven in 2005, forty-three in 2004,
ninety-seven in 2003, fifty-one in 2002, and five in 2001. Id. See also Šešelj (IT-03-67)
http://www.icty.org/case/Šešelj/4 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). In the Šešelj trial, the Trial
Chambers made thirty-one orders in 2008, twenty-three in 2007, twenty-one in 2006,
twenty-seven in 2005, eight in 2004, and nine in 2003. Id. The trial Chamber made thirtyone decisions in 2008, twenty-three in 2007, twenty-one in 2006, twenty-seven in 2005, eight
in 2004, and nine in 2003. Id.
154
Cf. Alain Frécon, Delaying Tactics in Arbitration, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 49 (Jan. 2005)
(discussing how motions distract the arbitrator). The filing of motions during arbitration
can be analogized to filing motions in a case because both distract from the issue at hand.
Id. See also Jeremy D. Spector, Awarding Attorney’s Fees to Pro Se Litigants under Rule 11, 95
MICH. L. REV. 2308, 2322 (1997) (discussing how unwarranted Rule 11 motions detract
attention from the case). The filing of unwarranted Rule 11 motions can be analogized to
filing unwarranted motions in the ICTY because both disrupt the underlying cause of
action. Id.
155
See infra notes 157–64, 166–70 (discussing the various advantages defendants gain
when they exercise their right of self-representation).
156
See infra notes 157–60, 162, 166 (noting some of these advantages as hindering the
truth, establishing an inaccurate record, categorizing themselves as the victim, arguing
politics, and criticizing the ICTY).
157
See generally Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, Transcript (Sept. 24, 1997).
Tihomir Blaškić, a Bosnian Croat army officer, delayed his trial and his verdict, and thus he
succeeded in delaying the exposure of the truth. Id. The ICTY showed its disapproval of
defendants bringing up extraneous topics because it wasted the court’s time, delayed
justice, and distorted the truth. Id. The tribunal reinforced that the purpose of the trials
was to expose the truth. Id.
158
See Claudio Grossman, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Arlen Specter & Steven Weinstein,
International Support for International Criminal Tribunals and an International Criminal Court,
13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1413, 1436 (2001). The article discusses that the victims cannot seek
reconciliation when the people responsible “flout the rule of law.” Id. Ivkovic asserts that
one of the purposes of the ICTY is to “preserve the stories and memories of the individuals
who themselves did not survive.” See also Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 265 (2001) (quoting
Margaret Vandiver, Presentation at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal
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because recording inaccurate stories diminishes the victims’ suffering
and trivializes the horror of the atrocities.159
Second, self-representation allows the accused to position
themselves as the victims and gain sympathy around the world.160 This
could leave the Bosnian people feeling victimized again or the world
disbelieving the victims’ stories. By allowing this categorization, the
ICTY also gives the defendant an opportunity to gain support from his
country, motivating him to stay on trial.161 Third, self-representation
gives defendants the opportunity to argue politics and to state their
opinions.162 Because most self-represented defendants are high-ranking
government or military officials, self-representation gives them the

Justice Sciences, Will Somebody Please Arrest These Guys?, The Work of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 1996, (Mar. 1997) (on file with the Stanford
Journal of International Law)).
159
See Grossman, McDonald, Specter, & Weinstein, supra note 158, at 1436. The authors
assert that a record of what happened assures that death and torture do not disappear or
only remain with the victims. Id. During the Nuremberg trials, the Chief of Counsel for
the prosecution demanded that “the ideas and motives, which moved these defendants to
treat their fellow men as less than beasts[]” must be disclosed. See also Louise Arbour,
Friedmann Award Address Litigation Before the ICC: Not If and When, But How?, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 8 (2001) (quoting GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRONDIN, THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 66–
68 (1992)). Further, the stories and concepts from those atrocities could not be forgotten.
Id.
160
See Milosevic, Calling Himself a Victim, Asks to be Freed by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2002, at A11 (acknowledging that Milošević, calling himself the victim, claimed that forcing
him to stand trial was the United Nations’ attempt to convert the victim into the culprit).
Id. See also Sebastian Rotella, Milosevic Says He’s the Victim, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A-1,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2002/feb/15/news/mn-28153.
Milošević
portrayed himself as the victim through showing pictures “of dismembered, decapitated,
and charred corpses of civilians who he said were killed by [NATO.]” Id. This benefited
him because NATO took responsibility for the deaths, thus leaving doubt that Milošević
may not have been the perpetrator. Id.
161
See Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, supra note 71, at 161. Scharf asserts that
“[Milosevic’s] approval rating in Serbia doubled during the first weeks of the trial, and two
years into the trial he easily won a seat in the Serb parliament in a nationwide election.” Id.
Serbs “cheer when [Milošević] outsmarts the prosecutors. When he’s defending himself all
alone against the world.” Scharf, The Legacy, supra note 65, at 917. Milošević’s trial was so
powerful that it gained support from his Serbian Radical Party and they forced Serbia to
televise his trial. Recent Publications, supra note 69, at 514–15.
162
See McClelland, supra note 64, at 36. Milošević took advantage of his opportunities on
cross-examination to present “lengthy political discourses.” Id. See also Jenia Iontcheva
Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L
L. 529, 573 (2008) (suggesting that Milošević and Šešelj argued more politics rather than
attempting to attack legal issues); Matthew Kaminski, Milosevic’s Strategy to Center on
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A9 (noting that Milošević also fought a battle of
politics).
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continual belief that they are still influential people in the world.163
Furthermore, defendants have an unrestricted opportunity to voice
opinions, thus incurring more attention, because no attorneys speak on
behalf of the self-represented defendants.164 In addition to these
advantages of self-representation, defendants are also able to criticize
and embarrass the ICTY.165
Last, the defendants want to use self-representation because it
guarantees them time to attack the legitimacy and showcase their
disapproval of the tribunal during their defense.166 Unfortunately, the

See Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact
on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 274 (2007). Milošević used his trial as a
platform to influence public opinion. Id. See also Turner, supra note 162, at 573. Saddam
Hussein used a defense that incorporated political arguments which received much media
attention. Id.
164
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, ¶ 4 (Nov. 1,
2004). On August 31, 2004, Milošević made a two-day opening statement. Id. Milošević’s
speeches helped because one “can’t help falling under his spell . . . [h]e’s very sharp and
he’s funny.” Id. See also Scharf, The Legacy, supra note 65, at 919. The Iraqi Governing
Council established the Iraqi Special Tribunal and Saddam Hussein mirrored his defense
after Milošević’s by using his trial to make speeches and political arguments unrelated to
his charges. See also Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the
Iraqi Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 911, 911–12,
930 (2005). ICTY defendants, such Šešelj and Milošević, were able to give their opinion
because they “did not feel as constrained by profession norms as their advocates might
have been.” Scharf, The Legacy, supra note 65, at 930 n.83. See also Turner, supra note 162, at
583. See also Marlise Simons, The Hand That Feeds Milosevic’s Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2002, at 10 (quoting Milošević as saying, “[t]he only reason I agreed to participate in this
case of yours is because I want to be able to address the public”).
165
See supra notes 147–52 (discussing defendants who criticize the legitimacy of the
ICTY).
166
See generally Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on the Request of the
Accused for an Opinion of Trial Chamber II on Professional Argument Challenging the
Legitimacy of the International Tribunal (May 13, 2005). Šešelj challenged the lawfulness of
the ICTY. Id. Milošević consistently reiterated that he did not recognize the ICTY as a
legitimate institution. Groome, supra note 54, at 965. “Milošević accused the ICTY of
‘victor’s justice.’” Williams, supra note 63, at 581. See also Slobodan Milošević: Key Quotes,
Feb. 11, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/02/11/milosevic.quotes/
index.html. Milošević’s quotes include:
I consider this tribunal a false tribunal and the indictment a false
indictment. It is illegal being not appointed by the UN General
Assembly, so I have no need to appoint counsel to (an) illegal
organ. . . . I would never commit suicide because I must struggle here
to topple this tribunal and this farce of a trial and the masterminds
behind it who are using it against people who are fighting for freedom
in the world. . . . Look at this court. Courts should be impartial. This
indictment has been raised according to what the British intelligence
service has said.
163
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court cannot hide from the unfavorable comments because the ICTY
transcribes all speech within the court and makes them available to the
public.167
Ultimately, these disparaging comments accomplish
defendants’ goals because the comments damage the ICTY’s reputation
and cast doubt over its legitimacy.168 Further, self-representation allows
defendants to attempt to humiliate the ICTY by showing it as a biased
institution.169 Therefore, defendants seek to emphasize these points in
Id.; Vojislav Šešelj in His Own Words, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2793899.stm.
Quotes include:
I don’t know when I’ll be back but I won’t be wasting time in The
Hague; I will unmask the anti-Serb plot that is going on there. . . . With
their stupid charges against me they have come up against the greatest
living Serb mind. I shall blast them to pieces.
Id.
167
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Transcript, 1857 ¶ 5–6 (Nov. 8, 2007). Šešelj
asserted that he was being “tried by an illegal and illegitimate court.” Id. Šešelj said that
“[y]ou, all you members of The Hague Tribunal Registry, can only accept to suck my
cock[]” in his February 7, 2005 submission, where Šešelj agreed to accept someone as his
legal adviser. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of
Counsel, ¶ 48 (Aug. 21, 2006). Milošević called his trial a farce. Prosecutor v. Milosevic,
Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript 67 ¶ 4–7 (Oct. 30, 2001). Milošević said “I consider this
Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment.” Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript, 2 ¶ 3–4 (July 3, 2001). Milošević attempted an initial defense
strategy of “discredit[ing] the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s legitimacy and impartiality.” Michael
P. Scharf, The International Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: Real Justice or Realpolitik?, 8 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 389, 389 (2002). He based this strategy on the fact that it has been
commonly accepted that the Nuremberg Trials were “tainted by ‘victor’s justice.’” Id. The
ICTY also documented Milošević saying “[y]ou are not a judicial institution; you are a
political tool.” Id.
168
See Julian A. Cook, Plea Bargaining at the Hague, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 473, 506 (2005).
Public comments from defendants were not the only reasons why the ICTY had a poor
reputation. Id. Procedural decisions also jeopardized the ICTY’s reputation. Id. Critics
made comments such as:
[w]ith the credibility of the ICTY already in tatters among segments of
the Balkan population, the Tribunal must not continue to employ plea
procedures that may further damage its already frayed reputation,
tarnish its standing in the larger world, and serve as an unfortunate
precedent for future international criminal courts.
Id. See also Patricia M. Wald, To “Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The Use of
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 535,
553 (2001) (noting that the Tribunal’s reputation was fragile); Danielle Tarin, Note,
Prosecuting Saddam and Bungling Transitional Justice in Iraq, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 467, 503 (2005)
(asserting that Milošević’s political rants threatened the ICTY’s reputation).
169
See Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges
and Prosecutors, supra note 40, at 132. The author asserts that:
Many participants expressed the view that the ICTY was biased
against the Serb people. Six Bosnian Serb participants stated that the
ICTY only targets Serbs or that the actions of the ICTY are only focused
on “one people.” As one participant described: “There are some rules
created in [the] world that only Serbs are criminals.” In addition, two
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their defense in hopes of receiving an acquittal or convincing the judge
to dismiss the case.170
Moreover, some Serbian defendants opt for self-representation
because they believe it gives them certain advantages throughout the
trials.171 Delays, humiliation, and politics are apparent throughout the
cases of self-represented defendants, which emphasize the ICTY’s need

specifically mentioned that, during the course of a NATO Stability
Force (hereinafter SFOR) action to arrest the former Prijedor police
chief, he was killed. They described the SFOR arrest as a kidnapping
and they saw this as a flagrant disregard of the judicial process. Three
felt that there was “no justice” or “no righteousness” in the ICTY.
Another participant raised the example of the linkage between
economic assistance and cooperation with the ICTY as additional
evidence for the politicization of the ICTY. Paradoxically, while all but
one of the Bosnian Serb legal professionals criticized the ICTY as
unfair, only two believed that it should be abolished.
Id. See also Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National
Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 423 (2006). The author asserts that:
Some observers believe that the ICTY's actions are actually
counterproductive because the indictments have hardened Serbs'
opposition to the peace treaty. Most Bosnian Serbs complain that the
tribunal is biased because it has selectively prosecuted more Serbs than
Croats or Moslems, even though atrocities were committed by all sides
. . . . Many Moslems, meanwhile, argue that indictments of Moslems
have been undertaken simply to counter Serbs' bias charges.
Regardless of the reasons, both Serbs and Moslems have so far been
reluctant to hand over indicted suspects.
Id. At one point the ICTY indicted seventy-six individuals and seventy were
Serbian. Damjan Panovski, Note, Some War Crimes are not Better than Others: The
Failure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to Prosecute
War Crimes in Macedonia, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 623, 635 (2004).
In addition, to the lenient indictment, the ICTY received complaints about refusing to
charge NATO for its involvement in the bombing of Serbia. Turner, supra note 162, at 579.
Some thought NATO should have been charged with war crimes as well. Id.
170
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Motion for
Disqualification, ¶¶ 19, 27 (Feb. 16, 2007). Šešelj filed a motion to disqualify his judge
alleging partiality. Id. The President described the motion as “numerous unfounded
allegation[s]” and he dismissed the motion after reiterating that the judge was not biased
because there was a disagreement between the judge and the accused. Id. The Chambers
decided against Milošević’s motion to dismiss due to his allegations of the ICTY being
biased. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Decision on Preliminary Motions,
¶¶ 18–22 (Nov. 8, 2001) The Appeals Chamber held there were three ways in which bias
on the part of a judge could be determined. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1,
Judgement (July 21, 2000). The first was actual proof, the second was if the judge has some
interest in the matter, and the third was if a reasonable person would perceive bias. Id.
171
See supra notes 160–61 (discussing various advantages such as gaining sympathy and
support).
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to control the courtroom in order to contain defendants’ exploitation of
the court.172
B. ICTY’s Crucial Need to Control the Courtroom
A fundamental right throughout jurisprudence is the right to selfrepresentation.173 But, this right is not absolute, and courts should
control the defendant in order to ensure efficiency, fairness, and
effectiveness in pursuing justice.174
The first reason for controlling defiant, self-represented defendants
is to ensure efficient trials.175 The ICTY needs to control defense tactics
of self-representation because it owes a duty to the defendant to provide
him with the right of a speedy trial.176 Public policy suggests, however,
that the ICTY cannot isolate its own interests or those of the defendants.
It also needs to consider the public’s interest of learning the truth.177
Aside from a quick conclusion, efficiency ensures that evidence remains
undestroyed and witnesses’ memories are not diminished.178 Also,
because of the countless atrocities, the ICTY should focus on indicting

172
See infra Part III.B (discussing that disruptive, self-represented defendants accentuates
the ICTY’s need to control them).
173
See supra Part II.C (discussing the origins and facets of self-representation).
174
See supra notes 79–80 (discussing how the right of self-representation is a qualified
right).
175
See infra notes 176–79 (discussing that efficiency encompasses such facets as the right
to a speedy trial, public interest, and prosecutorial workload).
176
See International Tribunal Statute, supra note 43, at arts. 20(1), 21(4)(c). Article 20(1)
mandates the ICTY to conduct its trial proceedings in a fair and expeditious manner. Id. at
art. 20(1). Article 21(4)(c) states that the accused is guaranteed a right of a trial without
undue delay. Id. at art. 21(4)(c).
177
See id. at art. 20(1). Article 20(1) states that the ICTY must take into consideration the
protection of witnesses and victims when conducting a fair and expeditious trial
proceeding. Id. Judge Shahabuddeen asserted that the prosecution represents the public
interest, that the prosecutor has to take the public’s interest into account, and that the
Prosecutor must act objectively and fair. See also Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-0254, Decision in the Appeals Chamber on Admissibility of Prosecution Investigator’s
Evidence, ¶ 18 (Sept. 30, 2002) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting). The Office of the
Prosecution issued Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecution in 1999 and one of
the standards is to protect the public interest. Judith A. McMorrow, Creating Norms of
Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals: A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 139, 162 (2007).
178
See Williams, supra note 63, at 572. The ICTY needed prompt trials to prevent the
accused from being incarcerated too long, to curtail apprehensions, and to ensure that the
defense’s case was not disrupted. Id. Pretrial incarceration of the accused is particularly
important. Id. Due to the ICTY’s tremendous workload, it was inevitable that defendants
would be incarcerated for extensive amounts of time, even before their trial started. Id.
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the most egregious offenders in order to avoid an unrealistic caseload.179
This need for efficiency encompasses a variety of facets, such as the right
to a speedy trial, the public interest, and the avoidance of an
overwhelming prosecutorial workload.180 In addition to conducting
efficient trials, the ICTY also needs to control its proceedings in order to
ensure fair trials.181
The second reason for curtailing defendants is that fairness is an
essential factor in any judicial process, including the ICTY. The ICTY
must control defendants while still conducting fair trials in order to
combat the criticism that it is not a legitimate tribunal.182 Due to
comments about the illegitimacy of the tribunal made during high
profile cases, the ICTY needs to ensure legitimacy for the victims in the
former Yugoslavia.183 By fairly preventing the defendants from making
See General Assembly Hears Appeals by Tribunal Judges to ‘Keep Doors Open’ Until all War
Criminals in Rwanda, Balkans are Brought to Justice, U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, Oct. 9, 2006. The
article states:
PAVLE JEVREMOVIC (Serbia) said his Government had expressed
full determination and political commitment to ensuring that all
individuals indicted for the most serious violations of international
law during the conflicts in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia be
brought to justice[] . . . . In that regard, since 2004, Serbia had invested
considerable efforts in apprehending and transferring to The Hague 16
indictees, mostly high-ranking military and police officers. In July, the
Government had adopted an action plan on further cooperation with
the Tribunal, and thus far, appropriate institutional mechanisms had
been put in place with a single purpose: to locate, arrest and transfer
Ratko Mladic and other remaining fugitives.
Id. See also Jouet, supra note 64, at 286. Jouet asserts that the ICTY prosecutors focus most of
their time and resources on the most egregious perpetrators who committed the most
widespread crimes. Id.
180
See supra notes 176–79 (discussing the right to a speedy trial, public interest, and
prosecutorial workload).
181
See infra notes 182–89 (discussing the ICTY’s obligation to ensure fair trials).
182
See Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 114 (2002) (noting that unfair trials give off the appearance
that international tribunals are illegitimate). See also Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for
Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 73 (2001). The ICTY has a separate sentencing phase. Id.
Keller asserts that people only see the ICTY as legitimate if its proceedings are fair. Id.
Therefore, “the elimination of a separate sentencing hearing jeopardizes the perception of
fairness at the Tribunals in return for mere marginal increases in operating efficiency.” Id.
Fair trials often determine if a tribunal is considered credible or legitimate. Tuinstra, supra
note 108, at 62–63.
183
See Mark Thieroff & Edward A. Amlyer, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in
the Balkans: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE
J. INT’L L. 231, 249 (1998). Those people who are accused of violations give ICTY little
legitimacy, which may undercut the ICTY’s ability to lessen victims’ pain and suffering. Id.
See also Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar, & Lynn Maalouf, Early Reflection on Local
179
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such comments, it helps victims ease their pain because it pronounces
the perpetrators responsible.184
Moreover, with fair trials comes
predictability and certainty, which are other facets the ICTY defendants
deserve to have in their proceedings.185 Also, mandating fair trials
allows the ICTY to attempt to silence the critics’ contentions that the
ICTY caters only to powerful organizations and countries.186
Another reason for fair trials is that if one tribunal conducts unfair
trials, then it could potentially have long-lasting, negative impacts on
other future regional criminal tribunals.187 Because the ICTY uses
frameworks from other international proceedings, specifically the
Nuremberg Trials, it is inevitable that future tribunals will look at the

Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
1065, 1072 (2007). Tribunals gain legitimacy by their ability to represent and act in the
interests of the victims. Id. For the ICTY, a “population[] with a high number of victims
such as Bosnian Muslims have shown higher levels of support for the Tribunal than
Bosnian Serbs or Croats.” Id.
184
See Thieroff & Amlyer, supra note 183, at 249. The authors assert that because the
accused do not regard the ICTY as legitimate, it impedes on the ICTY’s ability to help
reconcile the victims’ pain. Id. See also Neil Boister, Failing to get to the Heart of the Matter in
Sierra Leone?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1100, 1104–05 (2004). The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Sierra Leone recognizes that a legitimate tribunal encompasses the
“victims’ right to know the truth.” Id.
185
See Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 24 (Feb. 20, 2001). The
Appeals Chambers argued that the essential features of a trial of consistency, stability, and
predictability were applied to the ICTY. Id. See also Asa W. Markel, The Future of State
Secrets in War Crimes Prosecutions, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2007) (discussing that the
requirements of a fair trial are encompassed in the stare decisis principle and the results are
“certainty and predictability”).
186
See Robert M. Hayden, Biased “Justice:” Humanrightsism and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (1999). Hayden asserts
that the ICTY refused to charge NATO workers for their actions that are arguably
comparable to the Yugoslavs indicted. Id. The ICTY also refused to indict NATO worker
with charges of war crimes. Id. Hayden also asserts that the ICTY only indicts those whom
the Americans want prosecuted. Id. Critics argued that the ICTY was “designed in a
biased and unfair manner, serving the interests of powerful western states and
international organizations at the expense of local interests.” Simpson, supra note 149, at
1275–76.
187
See Cogan, supra note 182, at 114. Cogan asserts that “[w]orse still, the entire
enterprise of justice for these types of heinous crimes, whether in international courts,
domestic courts, or otherwise, might be dealt a serious blow.” Id. The ICTY’s development
of substance and procedure will have an impact on the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court. See also Susan Tiefenbrun, Peace with Justice, 3 HOFSTRA L. &
POL’Y SYMP. 1, 4 (1999). The International Criminal Court also needs to guarantee fair trials
to legitimize its jurisdiction, and this is analogous to the ICTY and how it can legitimize
itself through fair proceedings. Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuring a Fair Trial in the
International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation, 31
N. Y. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 535, 547 (1999).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 11

998

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ICTY for guidance on how to conduct trials at the global level.188 If the
ICTY’s trials are unfair or appear unfair, then the future tribunals that
look to the ICTY for direction could suffer from criticism of unfairness.189
But, the ICTY must also be effective, not simply conduct fair trials.190
The last rationale for the ICTY asserting more control is to ensure it
effectiveness.191 The ICTY needs to control defendants in order to
effectively deter future defendants from exercising the right of selfrepresentation inappropriately.192 In addition, the ICTY could make an
impression and potentially prevent future crimes by demonstrating an
effective punishment for perpetrators.193
Further, without selfrepresented defendants creating chaos, the ICTY can focus on the merits

188
See supra note 43 (discussing how the ICTY looked to the Nuremberg trials for
guidance). Initially, the hope for the ICTY was to advance the international law introduced
at Nuremberg. Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in
International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 336 (1999). Also, the ICTY provided
hope that “advancements in the enforcement of international law[]” would be created. Id.
(quoting Tina Rosenburg, Conference Convocation, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1383, 1407 (1998)).
189
Kate Kerr, Fair Trials at International Criminal Tribunals: Examining the Parameters of the
International Right to Counsel, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1227, 1253–54 (2005). It is important for the
ICTY to set a good example for future tribunals because its decisions will be followed as
precedent. Id. For example, the Special Panel for Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor did
not follow international precedent about the right to counsel and, therefore, the
international community criticized its proceedings. Id.
190
See infra notes 192–96 (discussing the need for the ICTY to be effective).
191
See James Paul Benoit, The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 53
NAVAL L. REV. 259, 286–87 (2006). Other criticisms of the ICTY’s effectiveness are based on
the fact that the Tribunal is located so far away from where the crimes took place and
where the victims live. Id. Furthermore, Benoit asserts that the Tribunal is ineffective
because it is temporary. Id. One specific ineffective instance was that many criminals
committed their horrific crimes after the establishment of the ICTY, leading critics to the
conclusion that the ICTY is not an effective deterrent. Id. Serbia criticized the ICTY for not
providing clear information about the operations or purposes of the ICTY. See also
Stromseth, supra note 163, at 274. This led to Serbs perceiving the ICTY negatively and
skeptically. Id. See also infra notes 192–96 (discussing some of ineffective instances that
challenged the ICTY).
192
See supra note 71 (demonstrating that Šešelj and Krajišnik decided to emulate
Milošević’s defense of self-representation during their trials and thus it can be inferred that
if the ICTY properly controlled Milošević’s antics, Šešelj and Krajišnik would have had no
incentive to use that defense strategy).
193
See Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 780–81 (2006). The authors assert that “the
higher frequency of humanitarian atrocities in weak or failed states may be due to the lack
of credible institutions and mechanisms within those states that can constrain likely
perpetrators of such atrocities.” Id. Therefore, if those types of institutions could
effectively punish, it may lead to less crime. See id. But see Mirjan Damaska, What is the
Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI-KENT L. REV. 329, 339 (2008). Damaska asserts
that the threats of punishment failed to prevent future crimes. Id. Therefore, optimism
about deterrence as a major role in international criminal law has faded. Id.
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of the case and attempt to reconcile the Balkan region.194 Also, if the
ICTY conducts effective trials, then this could also help justify its
existence and gain support.195 Last, effective trials enable the ICTY to
expand and develop international criminal law.196 Although the ICTY
endures criticism about the behavior of its defendants, its treatment and
control mechanisms have certain strengths and weaknesses when
restraining the stall tactics and delays of self-representation.197
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of the ICTY’s Treatment and Control of SelfRepresentation
When defendants substantially delay the ICTY through their selfrepresentation antics, the tribunal needs to respond.198 The ICTY
194
See Brady Hall, Using Hybrid Tribunals As Trivias: Furthering the Goals of Post-Conflict
Justice While Transferring Cases from the ICTY to Serbia’s Domestic War Crimes Tribunal, 13
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 39, 49–50 (2005). The principle of justice is the basis for the ICTY’s
inability to reconcile the Balkan region. Id. One reason for this inability is that justice does
not always yield reconciliation. Id.
195
See Markovic, supra note 63, at 954. Markovic asserts that in order for the ICTY to be
accepted as an effective tribunal, everyone in the Balkan region would have to perceive its
rulings as legitimate. Id. For example, the ICTY’s decision to impose counsel onto
Milošević caused controversy. Id. In addition, it reinforced Serbia’s doubts that the ICTY
attempted to achieve peace and restore the Balkan region. Id. Finally, it fueled the Serbs’
suspicions that the tribunal had biases or prejudices against Serbia. Id. Unfortunately,
accused criminals jeopardize the ICTY’s ineffectiveness of its prosecutorial duties by
holding public office and living a high profile life. Dean Adams, The Prohibition of
Widespread Rape as a Jus Cogens, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 357, 384 (2005). Peter Cancar,
Vojislaw Maksimovic, and Velibor Ostojic are accused of being responsible for the
widespread rape throughout the Yugoslavia Conflict. Id. These men hold “public offices
and maintain[] otherwise high profile positions in the municipality of Foca.” Id.
196
Developing International Law, http://www.icty.org/sid/324#developing (last
visited Feb. 11, 2010). One of the major goals of the ICTY was to expand international law.
Id. The ICTY succeeded in developing substantive and procedural law, such as prohibiting
torture in international law, punishment of sexual violence, protective measures, for
witnesses, and duress as a defense. Id. Yet, more can still be done if the ICTY remains
effective. See id.
197
See infra Part III.C (discussing strengths and weaknesses of control mechanisms and
treatment of self-representation).
198
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel
(Aug. 21, 2006). See also Göran Sluiter, Compromising the Authority of International Criminal
Justice. How Vojislav Šešelj Runs His Trial, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 529, 530 (2007) [hereinafter
“Sluiter, Compromising the Authority”]. Sluiter describes the ICTY’s assignment of counsel
as:
[A]n accused at the ICTY may, in exceptional circumstances, also be
assigned counsel who will then be in charge of the defence, in which
case the accused will generally play a marginal role in his own
defence, or presentation thereof. The ICTY Trial Chamber took this
drastic measure on 21 August 2006, because the conduct of the accused
led “the Chamber to conclude that there is a strong indication that his
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attempts to address disruptive defendants in order to regain control of
the courtroom.199 Various approaches to disruptions caused by selfrepresented defendants include abstaining from controlling the
defendant, assigning counsel, assigning amicus curiae, and assigning
standby counsel.200
Each approach has certain strengths and
weaknesses.201
The first approach is to refuse to disrupt the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation. The ICTY realizes that a defendant’s approach includes
delaying trials, and this sometimes prompts the prosecution to submit a
motion for the tribunal to assign counsel to the disruptive defendant.202
However, when the ICTY denies the request, it allows the defendant to
continue using the courtroom to abuse witnesses, the prosecution, and
self-representation may substantially and persistently obstruct the
proper and expeditious conduct of a fair trial.”
Id. Williams asserts that the court needed to respond in order to maintain the Tribunal’s
due process interest in conducting a fair trial. See also Williams, supra note 63, at 555.
199
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript, at 5, ¶ 5–8 (July 3, 2001).
Judge May attempted to control Milošević during his initial appearance. Id. Milošević
tried to make a speech and Judge May interrupted him and assured him that he would
have his time to defend himself. Id. The Trial Chamber indicated that counsel would take
over Šešelj’s case if he became disruptive. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision
on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with His
Defense (May 9, 2003). The Court assigned amicus curiae to Krajišnik. Prosecutor v.
Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Decision on Momcilo Karjisnik’s Request to Self-Represent,
on Counsel’s Motion to Appointment of Amicus Curiae, and on the Prosecution Motion of
16 February 2007, ¶ 34 (May 11, 2007). The Trial Chamber has the “inherent power[], to
control its own proceedings and, in the interests of justice, to appoint a ‘duty counsel’ to
assist the accused.” Jørgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation, supra note 86, at 67.
200
See supra Part II.D (discussing the options that the ICTY has when dealing with selfrepresented defendants).
201
See infra notes 203–04, 206–07, 210–11, 213–16, 218–20, 222–23, 227–32 (analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of each approach to self-representation).
202
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defense, ¶ 1 (May 9, 2003).
The Prosecutor requested counsel for Šešelj for various reasons. Id. These reasons include
the following: because the case was so complicated, because Šešelj intended to harm the
ICTY and intended to use the ICTY to promote Serb national interest, because of the
possibility of being disruptive, and because of the need to safeguard justice and promote
peace in Yugoslavia. Id. The Prosecution wanted to assign counsel to Milošević because of
his obstructionist and disruptive behavior. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the
Assignment of Defense Counsel, ¶ 18 n.55 (Nov. 1, 2004). Furthermore, the Prosecution
alleged that Milošević did not take his medicine correctly, which led to more health delays.
Id. The Prosecution insisted on counsel for Milošević because of the complexity of the case.
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript, at 15–18 (Aug. 30, 2001). However,
the Tribunal stressed that the accused still had the right to defend himself and that the
appointment of amicus curiae would help him with the complexity of the case. Id. The
ICTY (May, J.) said “it would not be practical to impose counsel on an accused who wished
to represent himself.” Id. at 18.
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the judges.203 Further, another weakness is that the tribunal cannot use
its usual threats of fines, jail time, suspension, or disbarment to control a
defendant who acts as his own counsel.204 These penalties would not
control the defendant because suspension and disbarment do not apply,
the defendant is already in jail, and a high-ranking defendant has the
money to pay the fine. However, there are certain strengths in allowing
a defendant to continue to use self-representation.205
Allowing a defendant to continue with self-representation creates
the assurance that the judges give more attention to conducting a fair
trial.206 Moreover, the ICTY should embrace this opportunity and
showcase its reluctance to trammel the defendant’s rights, thus hoping
“to bolster its own legitimacy and positively influence the acceptance of
present and future international tribunals.”207 However, the ICTY needs
to balance the defendant’s interest in his right to self-representation with

203
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal Against the
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel (Oct. 20, 2006) (finding Šešelj
intimidated witnesses). The ICTY would not have allowed this mistreatment if a
traditional defense counsel did this in the courtroom. Scharf & Kang, supra note 164, at 926.
Scharf and Rassi assert that:
An even more significant ramification of the Trial Chamber’s ruling is
that it has given Milosević the chance to make unfettered speeches
throughout the trial. In contrast, a defendant is ordinarily able to
address the court only when he takes the stand to give testimony
during the defense’s case-in-chief, and in the usual case, the defendant
is limited to giving evidence that is relevant to the charges, and he is
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. By acting as his own
counsel, Milosević has been able to begin each stage of the trial with
hours of opening arguments, which have included Hollywood-quality
video and slide-show presentations showing the destruction wrought
by the 1999 NATO bombing campaign.
Michael P. Scharf & Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International Right to
Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 3, 4 (2005).
204
Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom, supra note 71, at 161. Scharf asserts that there is
basically nothing a judge can do to control an unruly defendant who uses selfrepresentation. Id. Scharf and Kang assert that a judge can usually control behavior
through expelling disruptive individuals from the courtroom, imposing prison time or
fines, or suspending an attorney’s license. Scharf & Kang, supra note 164, at 930. However,
a case where defendants represent themselves is not considered an “ordinary case.” Id.
205
See infra text accompanying notes 206–07 (discussing some strengths of allowing the
defendant to continue to represent himself).
206
See Jørgensen, Right of the Accused, supra note 103, at 720 (noting that when a
defendant uses self-representation, he forgoes various advantages from counsel, thus
making courts concerned about fairness).
207
Constantinos Hotis, A “Fair and Expeditious” Trial: A Reappraisal of Slobodan Milosevic’s
Right to Self-Representation Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 775, 777 (2006) (asserting that if a defendant’s right to self-representation is
trammeled, then it would impede on the fairness of trials that the ICTY wishes to achieve).
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its own interest in conducting a speedy and unimpaired trial in order to
reveal the full truth and achieve justice for victims.208
The next approach is the assignment of counsel through a balancing
test, which also produces strengths and weaknesses.209 A major strength
of this approach is placing the defendant on notice that his right to selfrepresentation is not absolute and that if he interferes with the fairness or
expeditious progress of the trial, his right could be retracted.210
Although this approach may result in the accused losing his right to selfrepresentation, the entire trial is fair.211 However, the ICTY’s balancing
approach for deciding if it will assign counsel also produces significant
difficulties.212
The ICTY sometimes remains reluctant to assign counsel, which
becomes another weakness.213 Therefore, an unruly defendant is not
restricted when the ICTY announces that his right cannot be infringed
even if the notions of a fair and expeditious trial could be jeopardized.214
However, when the ICTY decides the principle of fairness outweighs the
right of self-representation, it could produce criticism that the decision
unfavorably disadvantages the defendant.215 Finally, the balancing
208
See Mark S. Ellis, The Saddam Trial: Challenges to Meeting International Standards of
Fairness with Regard to the Defense, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 171, 183 (2006). For example, if
a defendant continuously disrupted the trial, in the interest of justice the balance would tip
toward relinquishment of the right to self-representation. Id.
209
See infra notes 210–11, 213–16 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the
assignment-of-counsel balancing test).
210
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal against the
Trial Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel (Dec. 8, 2006) (deciding not to
use the balancing test). See also Hotis, supra note 207, at 781. The Milošević case is the
primary example of this balancing test. Id. The ultimate goal was to limit the defendant’s
rights in order to guarantee that fairness and justice would not be sacrificed. Id.
211
See Jørgensen, The Problem of Self-Representation, supra note 86, at 70. Some criticized
the ICTY for focusing only on the limits that should be imposed on the accused in order to
have a fair trial. Id. However, others have argued in rebuttal that even though an interest
such as the right to self-representation might be limited, the result is that the trial has
overall fairness. Id.
212
See infra notes 213–16 (discussing the weaknesses involved in the ICTY’s refusal to
assign counsel).
213
See Jørgensen, Right of the Accused, supra note 103, at 726 (noting that the Milošević
case primarily displayed this reluctance); see also Sluiter, Karadžić on Trial, supra note 98, at
620 (asserting that the ICTY extended the right of self-representation to individuals who
abuse the right and the trial).
214
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, ¶ 41 (Apr. 4, 2003)
(acknowledging that Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute mandates that the tribunal ensure fair
trials, but holding that the rights of the accused cannot be infringed in order to accomplish
that goal).
215
See Göran Sluiter, Fairness and the Interest of Justice, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 9, 19 (2005).
This reaction came as a result of the ICTY assigning counsel to Milošević due to his health
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approach for assigning counsel is too stringent because it forces the
tribunal to find that the defendant’s behavior reaches a level that is
“substantial and persistent.”216
Another control mechanism the ICTY has is the assignment of
amicus curiae.217 One of the major strengths of this approach is that the
amicus curiae assists the defense and ensures a fair trial for the
defendant because the amicus curiae understands how to properly
administer a defense in the tribunal.218 Additionally, because the amicus
curiae does not represent the defendant, it does not disturb his right to
self-representation.219 Moreover, because the amicus curiae is not part of
the defense, the amicus curiae does not have to follow the defendant’s
suggestions.220 However, flaws also arise from assignment of amicus
curiae.221
The amicus curiae approach is weak because the “amicus counsel is
not a party in the trial and [it] may disturb the adversarial nature of the
proceeding.”222 Additionally, when a defendant does not take advantage
problems. Id. Critics disapproved of this decision and thought it “further contributes to
the Tribunal’s negative image in parts of the former Yugoslavia.” Id.
216
Scharf argues that the formula adopted by the Appeals Chamber would be hard to
justify when the right of self-representation should yield to the notions of fairness. SelfRepresentation Versus Assignment, supra note 64, at 45.
217
See infra notes 218–20, 222–23 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of amicus
curiae).
218
See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript, at 7 (Aug. 30, 2001). For
example, the amicus curiae would know when to object to evidence or during cross
examination. Id. Furthermore, it understands mitigating and exculpatory evidence and
can bring it to the attention of the tribunal. Id. The Tribunal said that amicus curiae would
act in a way to ensure a fair trial, just as counsel would secure a fair trial. Id.
219
See Scharf & Kang, supra note 164, at 926. The ICTY made it abundantly clear that the
amicus curiae would not put forth a positive defense because that is the responsibility of
defense counsel or, as in the Milošević case, the responsibility of the accused. Id. The
assignment of amicus curiae does not disturb the defendant’s right to self-representation
because it does not replace the defendant as his own counsel. Recent Publications, supra note
69, at 514.
220
See Tuinstra, supra note 108, at 53–54. The amicus curiae can act independently of the
accused because he does not have to follow his instructions or accede to his strategy. Id.
Furthermore, the amicus curiae is not even required to speak with the defendant. Id.
Therefore, the amicus curiae can assist the court “without having to breach their
professional obligations.” Id.
221
See infra notes 222–23 (discussing weaknesses of the assignment of amicus curiae).
222
Simon Meisenberg, The Right to Self Representation before the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, BOFAXE June 19, 2004, available at http://www.ifhv.rub.de/imperia/md/content/
publications/bofaxe/2004/x273e.pdf. The author gave example of the Ntahobali case of the
ICTR, in which judges imposed amicus curiae counsel because they were nervous about
the accused cross-examining his rape victims. Id. Jørgensen, Right of the Accused, supra note
103, at 724 (suggesting that amicus curiae disturbs the adversarial nature of trial because it
cannot perform an “examination of charges through confrontation between two adverse
parties”).
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of his amicus counsel, the assignment does not help the trial.223
Therefore, the ICTY attempted another solution during the Šešelj trial
with the assignment of standby counsel.224
The last control mechanism available to the ICTY is the assignment
of standby counsel.225 This approach also has its advantages and
disadvantages.226
This approach aims to preserve the rights of
defendants and maintain their interest in a fair trial.227 In addition,
standby counsel ensures that the trial continues expeditiously and
attempts to free the trial of interruptions, adjournments, or
disruptions.228 Conversely, the assignment of standby counsel revokes a
defendant’s long-standing, fundamental right to self-representation.229
Moreover, this control mechanism places an additional burden on the
Trial Chambers because it needs to give disruptive defendants an explicit
warning about their behavior.230 Also, the tribunal may have to
223
See Scharf & Kang, supra note 164, at 926 (suggesting Milošević’s amicus counsel did
not affect his trial because he used his trial to “play on Serbia’s psychological
vulnerabilities and continued Serb resentment of the 1999 NATO bombing”). Milošević
refused to cooperate with the amicus curiae, leading to the conclusion that it could not help
the Tribunal. Markovic, supra note 63, at 948.
224
See supra text accompanying notes 101–02 (discussing the establishment of assignment
of standby counsel during the Šešelj trial).
225
See supra text accompanying notes 103–05 (discussing the control mechanism option of
standby counsel).
226
See infra notes 227–32 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of assignment of
standby counsel).
227
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Order Concerning Appointment of
Standby Counsel and Delayed Commencement of Trial, Decision on Assignment of
Counsel (Oct. 25, 2006); Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment
of Counsel (Aug. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Šešelj, IT-03-67-PT Decision on Assignment];
Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense (Mar. 1, 2005).
228
See Williams, supra note 63, at 578. This approach was also used in the trial of Prlić,
where the Tribunal said “it is the duty of the Trial Chamber to make sure that the
proceedings would not be halted by foreseeable, and therefore avoidable, risks.” Id.
229
See Šešelj, IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment, at ¶ 77 The court held that:
While it is clear that the conduct of the Accused brings into question
his willingness to follow the “ground rules” of the proceedings and to
respect the decorum of the Court, more fundamentally, in the
Chamber’s view, this behaviour compromises the dignity of the
tribunal and jeopardises the very foundations upon which its proper
functioning is based.
Id.
230
See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal against the
Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel, ¶¶ 22–26 (Oct. 20, 2006). The
Appeals Tribunal focused on Article 21(4)(d), Article 21(4), and Rule 80(B) when it
rendered its decision. Id. It stated that “an accused should be duly warned before
restricting those rights.” Id. Therefore “[i]n this way, an accused is fully and fairly
informed and is afforded the opportunity to change the disruptive circumstances, whether
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demonstrate that the defendant is displaying a deliberate obstructionist
behavior or extreme conduct, not merely having an intention to obstruct
proceedings.231 Another drawback is that the ICTY faces serious
objections when it revokes rights of defendants, such as Šešelj, who
began a hunger strike until full reinstatement of his self-representation
right.232 As evidenced by the above, if the ICTY does not develop a
solution in the Karadžić trial that accedes to everyone’s demands, there
may be serious implications.233
D. The Implications if Self-Representation is Not Controlled in Karadžić Trial
Maintaining or restricting fundamental rights at trials is a difficult
task for the ICTY.234 Current solutions pose threats to justice and
fairness.235 Now, the ICTY has another opportunity to attempt to control
a high-profile defendant, Karadžić, who plans to use the defense strategy
of self-representation.236 However, if the ICTY does not solidify a proper
mechanism, it could have serious implications.237
The first major implication of not controlling defendants is that
criminals in future criminal or special tribunals would have an incentive
to be disruptive.238 Specifically, future war criminals could look to ICTY
defendants as models and realize that it would be difficult for tribunals
to control them.239 Continued use of these antics could jeopardize the

resulting from deliberate misconduct or unintentional factors, so as to avoid surrendering
those rights.” Id. at ¶ 23 (citations omitted).
231
See Williams, supra note 63, at 579–80 (translating the opinion of dissenting judge
Antonneti, who thought the standard rose to a level of deliberate obstructionist behavior:
“La Chambre ne peut pas . . . limiter le droit de l’Accusé à assurer personnellement sa
défense en se fondant sur des «intentions» obstructionnistes.” [roughly translated as “The
Chamber may not limit . . . the right of the Defendant to personally ensure his defense
because it is based on obstructionist intentions.”]).
232
See Sluiter, Compromising the Authority supra note 198, at 529, 533. Šešelj’s meaning of
full reinstatement of his right of self-representation was that the standby counsel needed to
be dismissed. Id. Šešelj began his hunger strike on November 10, 2006. Id. Šešelj ended
his hunger strike on December 6, 2006 when the ICTY fully restored his right to selfrepresentation. Id.
233
See infra Part III.D (discussing the implications on future trials if Karadžić’s defense by
self-representation is not controlled).
234
See supra Part III.C (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the control
mechanisms of the ICTY in an attempt to control defiant self-represented defendants).
235
See supra Part III.C (discussing the flaws in present control mechanisms).
236
See supra Part II.E (discussing Karadžić’s arrest and his upcoming trial in the ICTY).
237
See infra notes 238–44 (discussing major implications of not creating a perfect control
mechanism in the Karadžić trial).
238
See infra notes 239–40 (discussing the incentive to be disruptive).
239
See Michael A. Newton, A Near Term Retrospective on the Al-Dujail Trial & the Death of
Saddam Hussein, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 43 (2008) (asserting that Saddam
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integrity of future tribunals.240 Further, if a solution is not proposed in
the Karadžić trial, the opportunity to finalize fair standards for selfrepresentation may be lost.241 Without the ICTY establishing a guiding
principle, future tribunals will likely struggle with attempting to
establish an effective standard for controlling disruptive, selfrepresented defendants.242 This would lead to future tribunals focusing
more time and resources on a problem that could have been resolved.
Because there have been many ad hoc institutions since Nuremberg, it is
likely that future tribunals will be created and deal with similar
situations.243 In other words, this problem of uncontrollable, selfrepresented defendants will not conclude once the ICTY’s doors close.244
The ICTY should be cognizant of this responsibility and intensify its
efforts to establish a proper control mechanism.
Also, self-represented defendants could find support from ICTY
decisions upholding the right of self-representation.245 If precedential
value is given to the ICTY’s decision, it might be hard for future
tribunals to deny self-representation to defendants.246 However, if the
Hussein implemented the tactics of the defendants from the ICTY, knowing full well that
he could not be controlled).
240
See Tuinstra, supra note 108, at 59. The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber
agreed that self-representation could potentially undermine that tribunal, and at some
point it needed to be restrained; the Appeals Chamber went on to conclude that any
disruption could develop a “risk of a miscarriage of justice” because the trial was not
“conducted and concluded fairly.” Id.
241
See id. at 61 (noting some critics thought that the ICTY had an opportunity during
Milošević’s trial “to establish the highest fair trial standards of the accused”).
242
See Terry Prime & Gary Scanlan, Limitation and Personal Injury in the House of Lords —
Problem Solved?, 29 STATUTE L. REV. 111, 127 (2008) (without a guiding principle, the issue
becomes a matter of first impression). Cf. Roy Rydan Anderson, Of Mack Trucks, Road Bugs,
and Gilmore and Danzig: Happy Birthday Hadley v. Baxendale, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
431, 452 n.88 (2005) (discussing the legal principle of “disproportionate compensation” and
how if it does not have a guiding principle for implementation, it contradicts the aim of
codification). By analogy, if a guiding principle of how to control a self-represented
defendant is not established, it contradicts the aim of unifying standards across
international tribunals.
243
See supra notes 41–42, 164 (discussing the creation of various special tribunals
including Special Court of Sierra Leone, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and
Iraq’s Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity). See also S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) (creating the Special Tribunal Lebanon); G.A. Press Release,
U.N. Doc. GA/10135 (May 13, 2003) (announcing that the United Nations intended to help
with Khmer Rouge Courts arrangements).
244
See supra note 243 (demonstrating that there have been numerous special tribunals
since Nuremberg).
245
See Sluiter, Compromising the Authority, supra note 198, at 535 (noting that Krajišnik
sought self-representation and supported his motion through Šešelj’s case).
246
See Christopher “Kip” Hale, Note, Does the Evolution of International Criminal Law End
with the ICC? The “Roaming ICC”: A Model International Criminal Court for a State-Centric
World of International Law, 35 DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 429, 463 (2007) (noting that the
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ICTY effectively and fairly controls Karadžić’s right to selfrepresentation, then future tribunals can follow that precedent.247
The Trial Chamber has much to consider in its upcoming Karadžić
trial. This could be its last high-profile case, so the resulting precedent
could have long-lasting implications.248 The ICTY must evaluate why
Karadžić may want to represent himself and determine if those reasons
should be protected.249 Furthermore, the tribunal must understand why
it is crucial to control this right.250 It is necessary in order to promote
efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness.251 The tribunal will likely balance
these interests and could resolve this tension with a newly-developed
solution that appeases all sides.252 The Trial Chamber can look to its past
precedents and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each approach
attempted.253 A newly-developed procedure could have lasting effects
on future tribunals. As such, the ICTY must establish an appropriate
solution.254

International Criminal Court has recognized the ICTY’s decisions as legal precedent). See
also Higonnet, supra note 169, at 429 (“Indeed, the [ICTY’s] . . . jurisprudence contributes
markedly to the important development and expansion of international humanitarian law,
setting valuable precedent.”); Hotis, supra note 207, at 788–89 (noting that ICTY’s
precedents are well-established and well-respected). It has been argued that “[t]he ICTY
serves as a model for future international criminal tribunals, primarily because of its
statutory power of primacy over national courts.” David L. Herman, A Dish Best Not Served
at All: How Foreign Military War Crimes Suspects Lack Protection Under United States and
International Law, 172 MIL. L. REV. 40, 89 (2002).
247
See Göran Sluiter, The ICTR and The Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 962,
967 (2005) (noting that the ICTR followed the ICTY’s precedent with regard to protective
measures for witness). The Iraqi Special Tribunal could look at ICTY and SCSL precedent
to allow them to examine its own legality and statute. Scharf & Kang, supra note 164, at
923. The ICC followed the ICTY’s precedent with regard to procedure in its court. Patricia
M. Wald, ICTY Judicial Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 466, 466 (2004).
248
See Completion Strategy, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Jan. 16, 2010)
(stating that the ICTY’s goal is to have all its proceedings completed by 2012). Ratko
Mladić and Goran Hadžić, two top ranking officials the ICTY still seeks, remain at large.
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Fugitives,
http://www.icty.org/sid/10010 (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
249
See supra Part III.A (discussing why defendants decide to use their right to selfrepresentation).
250
See supra Part III.B (discussing the reasons why the ICTY needs to control its
defendants).
251
See supra Part III.B (discussing the reasons to control defendants are efficiency,
effectiveness, and fairness).
252
See supra notes 85, 98, 208 and accompanying text (discussing the solution needs to
balance various interests).
253
See supra Part III.C (analyzing the strengths and weakness of each of the ICTY’s
control mechanisms).
254
See supra Part III.D (discussing how a proper solution could be used by future
tribunals).
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IV. CONTRIBUTION
The ICTY’s most recent high-profile case serves as an opportunity to
finalize an appropriate method of controlling defiant defendants.255 This
Part will offer a resolution that will enable the ICTY to control trial
proceedings while respecting the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation.256 Part IV.A will elaborate on the ICTY’s current
mandate to warn a defendant while expanding on a common “three
strikes” approach.257 Part IV.B will offer an appropriate solution for
defendants who exhaust their three warnings.258
A. Proposed Three Strikes Approach
The right of self-representation entails that the defendant opting for
this right is fully aware of the risks and difficulties.259 Therefore, it is
understandable why the ICTY mandates that judges warn a selfrepresented defendant when he is acting inappropriately.260 However,
the ICTY receives criticism when it restrains or retracts the right of selfrepresentation.261 Thus, the ICTY should implement additional warnings
for defendants who act disruptively.262 Moreover, the ICTY should
inform the defendant of this procedure before the trial begins so that the
defendant is fully aware of the consequences of disruptive behavior.263
The three strikes or three warnings could allow for the ICTY to
demonstrate overall fairness by giving the defendant ample opportunity
to display appropriate behavior during his defense.264 This method does
See supra Parts II.E, III.C (discussing Karadžić and his upcoming trial and the
deficiencies in the ICTY’s current control mechanisms).
256
See infra Part IV.A–B (explaining a proposed solution that incorporates a three strikes
approach).
257
See infra Part IV.A (explaining a solution and its specifics for controlling disruptive,
self-represented defendants).
258
See infra Part IV.B (describing a possible approach of reinstatement after a reasonable
period of time and consideration for defendants who find themselves banned from the
courtroom).
259
See supra Part II.C (discussing origins of self-representation and its intricacies).
260
See supra notes 105, 230 (discussing the mandate that judges must warn every
disruptive defendant).
261
See supra Part III.B (discussing the Serbs’ criticism of the ICTY, among other critics
who thought the ICTY was ineffective).
262
See supra note 105 (explaining the current warning system). Therefore, this proposed
approach would simply expand use of a technique already in existence in the ICTY.
263
See supra text accompanying note 210 (explaining the ICTY’s notion of placing the
defendant on notice of his disruptive behavior). Accordingly, giving notice, before the trial
starts, of the three-strikes approach follows the ICTY’s current policy on notice.
264
See supra Part III.B (discussing fairness as a main reason why the ICTY needs to
control unruly, self-represented defendants).
255
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not infringe on the defendant’s right because it is a qualified right, and it
would be conditioned on not disrupting the court more than three
times.265 Moreover, this approach would allow the ICTY to maintain its
guarantee of a speedy trial because it permits only three interruptions or
disturbances throughout the case.266 In addition, by issuing three
warnings, the ICTY can silence its critics because it can point to specific
instances where it gave warnings.267
This would illustrate that
defendants cause their own rights to be restricted. However, there must
be a distinction between warning a defendant about disruptive behavior
and acknowledging that a defendant may improperly use a typical
lawyer’s tactic.
Because a majority of defendants are not attorneys, self-represented
defendants inevitably become confused under the ICTY rules for
procedure and evidence.268 Therefore, the self-represented defendant
should not receive a warning for asking an irrelevant or a leading
question.269 The defendant should receive a warning only after
displaying certain antics in an attempt to humiliate, embarrass, or attack
the legitimacy of the court.270 Once the ICTY takes away the defendant’s
right to self-representation, he needs counsel to complete his case.271
Previous ICTY cases illustrate the complexity and intricacy of issues,
leading to the decision that amicus curiae should assist the court.272
Additionally, the ICTY allows for the amicus curiae to act as defense
counsel when it is appropriate to ensure a fair trial.273 Therefore, if the
ICTY revokes the defendant’s right to self-representation, the amicus

265
See supra Part II.C (defining the right of self-representation as a qualified right, not an
absolute right).
266
See supra Part III.B (discussing how defendants’ delay tactics hindered right to a
speedy trial and increased the prosecutorial workload).
267
See supra Part III.B (discussing ways the ICTY can silence its critics). Therefore, this
proposal would fit with the ICTY’s goal of perfecting a solution to suppress its criticism.
268
See supra note 110 (mentioning the ICTY Rules for Procedure and Evidence and its
requirements for an attorney).
269
See supra note 147 (discussing the complexity of ICTY cases). This lends itself to a
defendant’s confusion on lawyerly tactics.
270
See supra Parts II.B, II.C, III.A (discussing Milošević, Šešelj, and Krajišnik’s attempts to
humiliate the courts and discussing the reasons why defendants would want to do such a
thing). See also notes 80, 216, 231 (discussing the ICTY’s need to show obstructionist
behavior or persistent behavior).
271
See supra Part II.D (discussing what duties assignment of counsel, standby counsel, or
amicus curiae perform when a defendant’s right to self-representation has been restricted
or restrained).
272
See supra Parts II.D, III.C (discussing how the ICTY has found it necessary to assign
amicus curiae to the defendants because of the complexity of their cases).
273
See supra Part II.D (defining and discussing amicus curiae and its functions and
duties).
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curiae can take over the case because he knows and understands the
defendant’s case.274 As a result, the ICTY could avoid assigning counsel
and therefore avoid vehement protests such as Šešelj’s hunger strike.275
The three-strikes approach would solve the problem of respecting
the defendant’s rights while allowing judges to control proceedings in
the ICTY.276 This approach can be implemented easily because of rules
and methods already established at the ICTY.277 However, the ICTY
would still have to allow the defendant to know what is happening in his
case.278
B. After the Right of Self-Representation Has Been Revoked
Once the ICTY restricts the right of self-representation, it needs to
ensure fairness by allowing a defendant to be aware of the happenings of
his case.279 The ICTY would have to choose between two ways to keep
the defendant abreast of his case. The first option would allow the
defendant to remain in the courtroom, but not actively participate in his
defense.280 The other option would be to ban the defendant from the
courtroom and allow him to watch his trial by closed circuit television
from his cell.
When the ICTY assigns counsel to a defendant, it sets out certain
modalities, including that counsel discuss the case and listen to concerns
of the defendant.281 Therefore, the ICTY could allow the defendant to
remain in the courtroom in order to confer with his counsel.282
Accordingly, the judge would have to be confident that the defendant
would not further disrupt the trial, even though he is not representing

See supra note 218 (explaining the strengths of the assignment of amicus curiae,
specifically the thorough understanding of procedure and defense tactics).
275
See supra Parts II.D, III.C (defining other control mechanisms and analyzing their
strengths and weaknesses).
276
See supra notes 85, 177, 208 (explaining the balancing approach used during
assignment of counsel). Therefore, this proposed approach also incorporated the ICTY’s
current balancing test.
277
See supra Part II.C (explaining the various aspects and methods of the control
mechanisms at the ICTY).
278
See infra Part IV.B (explaining what the ICTY should do after it bans the disruptive
defendant).
279
See supra Part III.B (discussing the fairness notion that needs to be incorporated into
trials).
280
See supra note 99 (discussing how the assignment of counsel completes the case for the
defendant and therefore the defendant is prohibited from actively participating in his case).
281
See supra Part II.D (defining assignment of counsel and its functions).
282
See supra Part II.D (discussing that any type of assigned counsel still needs to keep in
mind that they are acting on behalf of the defendant and certain responsibilities are still
intact).
274
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himself.283 If the defendant continues to interrupt court proceedings or
the judge is apprehensive about allowing the defendant to remain in the
courtroom, the court could ban the defendant.284
A main goal of the ICTY is to maintain fair and expeditious trials.285
Therefore, if allowing defendants to remain in the courtroom leads to
situations that are not conducive to the ICTY’s goals, the judge could
order the defendant to his cell.286 While in his cell, the defendant would
be able to follow his trial via closed circuit television.287 In addition,
technology can enable the defendant to talk with his counsel.288 This
approach mirrors the approach at the International Criminal Court.289
The ICTY should take such measures only if less drastic alternatives do
not remedy the situation of a disruptive defendant. These alternative
methods would serve as warnings to the defendant, and allow the
defendant to remain passively in the courtroom. However, this should
not be the absolute and final course for the defendant.
If a defendant finds himself banned from the courtroom and
watching his trial from a cell, he should have an opportunity to return to
the courtroom.290 After a suitable period of time the ICTY could grant a
defendant’s request to rejoin his counsel in the courtroom.291 Again, the
defendant would have to convince the judge that he will not resume

283
See supra Part III.A (analyzing why defendants disrupt the trials). The defendant
could accomplish the same goals by acting inappropriately even though he is not
representing himself.
284
See supra III.B (explaining the various reasons why the ICTY needs to control the
courtroom).
285
See supra Parts II.A, III.B (discussing the establishment of the ICTY, its main goals, and
the crucial need to control disruptive, self-represented defendants).
286
See supra Part III.B (discussing that the ICTY needs to control defendants to ensure
efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness).
287
See supra Part III.B (discussing the ICTY’s need to ensure fairness). If the ICTY did not
allow the defendant to follow his trial, it could lead to more criticism of being unfair.
288
See supra note 104 (explaining counsel’s duty to keep the defendant informed of his
proceedings).
289
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998), Art. 63(2), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute _English.pdf (“If the accused, being present before
the Court, continues to disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the accused and
shall make provision for him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside
the courtroom, through the use of communications technology, if required.”).
290
See supra notes 182–89 (discussing the notion of fairness as an essential component to
jurisprudence). Therefore, the proposed solution must maintain the element of fairness.
291
See supra Part III.B (discussing fairness as reason for the ICTY to control defendants).
Allowing the defendant the potential to rejoin his counsel reiterates this notion of fairness.
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disruptive antics.292 If the defendant becomes defiant again, the judge
could again banish him from the courtroom.293
With the ICTY preparing to begin Karadžić’s trial, it will
undoubtedly have another opportunity to establish a method to control a
disruptive self-represented defendant.294 The ICTY could create a
method that future tribunals can use as a guide.295 The ICTY could
redefine its legacy as a legitimate tribunal if it successfully controls
Karadžić’s anticipated stalling tactics and unruly behavior.296
V. CONCLUSION
Many of the victims, such as the one described in the Introduction,
are still looking for answers as to why they and the “2,000 Bosnians
[who] are believed to have died at Omarska” suffered under such
appalling circumstances.297 Questions remain—such as “who had
assembled the gangs of petty crooks, small-time gangsters, and corrupt
policeman who murdered them?”298 Hamdo received one answer when
he “spotted a familiar face striding across the grounds, a tall dark-haired
man with a nose like a knife, to whom the guards bowed and scraped in
deference. Simo—was that Simo Drljača . . . ? Hamdo knew Drljača had
transformed himself almost overnight from school legal advisor to Serb
nationalist . . . . But this?”299
Yugoslavia endured a gruesome history of ethnic strife and bloody
war. Its most recent conflict, the Bosnian War, revealed horrific crimes
with innocent victims, such as Hamdo, suffering the most. Atrocious
war crimes, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, and genocide symbolized the Bosnian conflict of the early
1990s. The world demanded a response, and the United Nations
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia. The ICTY’s goal was to discover the truth, to offer

See supra Part III.A (discussing reasons why defendants create disturbances and their
effect on the victims’ reconciliation and the image of the ICTY).
293
See supra Part III.B (discussing that efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness are reasons to
control defiant, self-represented defendants). These reasons apply to banishing a
disruptive defendant.
294
See supra Part II.E (discussing Karadžić, his arrest, his upcoming trial, and his threat to
exercise his right of self-representation).
295
See supra notes 246-47 (discussing the precedential value that decisions in the ICTY
could have on future tribunals).
296
See supra Part III.D (discussing the implications of not establishing an adequate and
proper control mechanism for Karadžić’s anticipated defense strategy).
297
See NEUFFER, supra note 1, at 41; supra Part I.
298
NEUFFER, supra note 1, at 41.
299
Id.
292
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reconciliation to the victims, and punish the perpetrators. However,
through their strategy of self-representation the accused made these
goals hard to attain. Because the right to self-representation is
considered a fundamental right in many jurisdictions around the globe,
the ICTY found it difficult to control this right when a defiant defendant
delayed trials and made a mockery of the courtroom proceedings.
The ICTY attempted various control mechanisms such as assignment
of counsel, assignment of standby counsel, and assignment of amicus
curiae. However, even though these solutions appeared to control the
defendant without infringing on his right, weaknesses proved that these
were not the perfect resolution. With the high-profile Karadžić case on
the horizon, the ICTY must establish a control mechanism that will
appease all in order to offer guidance to future tribunals facing the same
dilemma.
The resolution proposed in this Note attempts to correct the problem
of controlling self-represented, defiant defendants of international
criminal tribunals. It incorporates pieces of control mechanisms from
different jurisdictions around the world. Its purpose is to not infringe on
the rights of the accused, but to afford the court an opportunity to
control defendants without sacrificing any of the court’s objectives.
Unfortunately, it is likely that ad hoc tribunals will be established again
for similar situations; perhaps these future courts will be able to find an
easier and more efficient route to justice.
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